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This study considers how the Jewish displaced persons, who remained in 
camps in Europe following WWII, contributed to Zionist arguments for the 
creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. Zionist leaders maintained that 
no nation would receive the Jewish displaced persons, and that virtually 
all them wanted to go to Palestine. Therefore, they argued, a Jewisn 
state was necessary. The Harrison Commission, sent by Truman to study 
the displaced person (DP) problem in Europe, had determined that the 
great majority of Jewish DPs wanted to go to Palestine above all other 
possible places. Based on this report. President Truman supported 
Zionist goal3 and, thereafter, linked the DP problem with the Palestine 
problem. 
This study questions if the great majority of the Jewish DPs wanted to 
go to Palestine and if there were no other alternative places of refuge. 
It also questions how important the DP issue was for Zionist 
strategists. Last of all it examines the DPs themselves. What was the 
extent of Zionist activity in the camps? Why did polls show that almost 
all of the DPs wanted Palestine, when less than half of the DPs ended up 
going to Israel? A few related questions are also considered. If there 
were other immigration possibilities, did the Zionists support or oppose 
them? Were most of the DPs refugees from persecution or were they 
deliberately moved to DP camps by Zionist workers in order to put more 
pressure on American law-makers and serve as a pool for future 
immigration to a Jewish state? 
These questions were considered based on primary materials from four 
archives: the UN Archives in New York, the National Archives in 
Washington D.C., and the Central Zionist Archives in New York and 
Jerusalem. 
This study maintains that the issue of the DPs was central to the 
Zionist arguments. Therefore, Zionists leaders needed to ensure that the 
American public and law-makers conceived of the DPs as universally 
wanting to go to Palestine. In fact, only about one half of the DPs 
wanted to go to Palestine. The Zionists also needed to ensure that no 
other haven was found which might rob the DP argument of its force. Some 
of Zionist leaders opposed other immigration possibilities for the 
Jewish DPs, especially into the United States. 
11 
List of Abbreviations 
AACI Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. 
ACJ American Council for Judaism. 
AEC2A American Emergency Committee for Zionist Affairs. 
ECZA (reorganized as the AZEC November 1943) 
AJAFP American Jewish Agency for Palestine. 
AJC American Jewish Committee. 
AJDC American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. 
AJJDC 
J DC 
AZEC American Zionist Emergency Council. 
CCDP Citizens Committee on Displace Persons. 
CCLJ Central Committee of Liberated Jews. 
CDPX Combined Displaced Persons Executive. 
DPX Displaced Persons Executive. 
HIAS Hebrew Immigration and Aid Society. 
IGCR The Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees. 
IRO International Refugee Organization. 
JAFP Jewish Agency for Palestine. 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. 
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Organization. 
UNSCOP United Nations Special Committee on Palestine. 
WRB War Refugee Board. 
111 
Table of Contents 
Introduction page 1. 
Chapter One: page 12. 
American Zionism and Rescue. 
Notes: Chapter One page 33. 
Chapter Two: page 37. 
Refugeeism or Zionism? 
The DPs in Zionist Theory and Rhetoric. 
Notes: Chapter Two page 69. 
Chapter Three: page 74. 
The Displaced Person Camps. 
Notes: Chapter Three page 104. 
Chapter Four: page 112. 
The Brichah. 
Notes: Chapter Four page 142, 
Epilogue: page 148, 
Ammencan Zionism and 
Immigration to the United States. 
Notes: Epilogue page 166, 
Bibliography page 169 
IV 
Introduction 
On December 8, 1943, David Ben-Gurion told the 
Central Committee of Mapai (the leading political party of 
the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine) that the Jewish tragedy in 
Europe would help establish the Zionist argument. "The 
Zionist case rests not merely on the reality we have created 
thus far, but also on the reality of the Jewish catastrophe. 
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The world must be made to see this." Ben-Gurion had 
believed even before the Kristallnacht that only disaster 
would make the argument for a Jewish state irrefutable. The 
Zionists employed a strategy which stressed the horrors of 
the Holocaust as the mam method to underscore the need for 
a Jewish state. They focused their attentions on America 
knowing that America would emerge as the dominant power 
after World War II. After the war, the presence of Jewish 
Displaced Persons (DPs) in Europe continued to remind 
Americans of the devastation of the Holocaust. The DPs 
became the means to show the reality of the Jewish 
catastrophe, thus proving the need for a Jewish state. 
By stressing the situation of the DPs, the Zionists 
could demonstrate the validity of Zionist claims. The Jewish 
DPs served as a monument of humanity's inhumanity toward the 
Jews. The Zionists claimed that the Jewish DPs, having 
barely escaped from the concentration camps, and having no 
desire to remain in Europe, wanted to go only to Palestine. 
Since no other nation would receive them anyway, and 
since the British White Paper had restricted Jewish 
immigration to Palestine, the Jewish DPs were doomed to sit 
in the DP camps until the White Paper was rescinded or until 
a Jewish state was created. Their only desire and hope, so 
argued the Zionists, was Palestine. This argument proved 
powerful. Americans, still reeling from the news of the 
Holocaust, felt a moral obligation to bring justice to this 
last remnant of European Jewry. From all the information 
that the Americans had, the Zionist claims seemed justified. 
The gates of Palestine should be opened for the DPs. 
In order for the Zionist argument to hold, however, the 
Zionists had to ensure that the Americans continued to 
believe that the DPs did want to go to Palestine and that no 
other nation would receive them. This paper will investigate 
what the Zionists did to ensure that the American public 
believed the Zionist portrayal of the DPs. Also, since the 
new state, if created, would need a great infusion of new 
immigrants for survival, the Zionists needed to ensure that 
as many of the DPs as possible could and would immigrate. In 
sum, Zionist leadership organized and controlled the DP 
camps in order to convince the DPs to go to Palestine and 
also to screen the information that would reach the outside 
world from the camps. Zionist leadership also needed to 
ensure that no other nation would take the DPs. If some 
other haven was found, the argument that a Jewish haven was 
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needed would be weakened. Also, if other nations received 
Jewish DPs, the number of potential immigrants would be 
reduced. Although no nation offered immediate sanctuary, 
many pondered whether to accept Jewish DPs. Zionist leaders 
rarely supported, and at times even sabotaged efforts to 
secure these immigration possibilities. 
The first chapter will consider the Zionist war-time 
response to the issue of rescue. This study will establish a 
basic Zionist principle germane to the issue of the DPs. In 
Zionist philosophy, as articulated by Ben-Gurion, the 
leader of the Yishuv, and by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, one 
of the principal American Zionists, the creation of a Jewish 
state took precedence over the needs of individuals. As the 
Israeli scholar, Shabtai Teveth, said of Ben-Gurion, "In his 
2 
view, rescue 'for Palestine's sake' was the only rescue." 
Rescue had meaning only if it assisted in the development of 
a Jewish state. The Zionist record of WWII reveals the 
complete dedication of Zionists had to the concept of 
statehood. Other attempts at rescue were merely "witch 
doctor's medicine" providing only short term solutions and 
detracting from efforts to create a Jewish state. Only a 
Jewish state would solve the "Jewish problem" of 
statelessness. 
The sources for this chapter are widely diffuse. I was 
not able to find a single work which covered the scope of 
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the material. However there is a general debate over whether 
the Zionists intentionally sabotaged rescue attempts during 
World War II in an effort to preserve (or strengthen) the 
Zionist argument for Palestine. Alfred Lilienthal, in What 
Price Israel (1953) is perhaps the most outspoken of those 
who maintain that the Zionists did in fact undermine rescue 
efforts. Although Lilienthal is overtly polemical, he does 
present information which I have not seen refuted. His work 
corroborated with small sections in autobiographies by 
Moms Ernst, a personal friend of FDR, So Far So Good 
(1948) and Virginia Gildersieeve, a U.S. delegate to the 
United Nations in San Francisco, Many a Good Crusade 
(1954). Another American historian, Richard P. Stevens, in 
his book American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1942-1947 
(1962) concurred with Lilienthal. The Israeli scholar, 
Shabtai Teveth, in his massive first volume on Ben-Gurion, 
entitled, Ben-Gurion, The Burning Ground (1987) provided a 
refreshingly critical but sympathetic account of Ben-Gurion. 
Teveth demonstrates Ben-Gurion's commitment to the creation 
of a Jewish state, even, at times, at the expense of the 
refugees in Europe. Aaron Berman, in an article for the 
American Jewish Historical Quarterly, in March 1981, had 
done the same thing for some American Zionists, especially 
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver. Berman shows how the subject of 
the Zionist response to rescue was not a simple problem. He 
outlined the difference between a party led by Rabbi Steven 
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Wise who wanted to concentrate more on issues of rescue and 
Sliver's associates who insisted that Zionist efforts toe 
expended solely on the creation of the state. Peter Grose in 
Israel in the Mind of America (1983) had arrived at 
conclusions similar to Berman's. 
David S. Wyman, in his exhaustively researched book The 
Abandonment of the Jews (1984) provides some important 
information on the Zionist response to rescue legislation 
but does not always follow his information to its logical 
conclusion. After outlining the failure of American Zionism 
to support important rescue legislation, Wyman attributes it 
to infighting among rival Zionist factions and does not 
explore the possibility of its intentionality. He dismisses 
the issue by saying he found no evidence to support the 
contention that the Zionists avoided rescue efforts. He goes 
on to say an abundance of documentation "shows that before, 
during, and after the war Zionists time and again backed 
efforts to open the United States and other areas besides 
3 • 
Palestine to Jewish refugees." In conclusion, the secondary 
sources seem to fall into three categories: those which 
insist that the Zionists failed to support--or even opposed-
rescue efforts which did not include Palestine; those 
which maintain that Zionism itself had many different 
degrees of response to the rescue issue, some advocating a 
temporary focus on rescue, others insisting that the 
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creation of a Jewish state came before all other issues; and 
those which defend the Zionist record in toto. In general, 
the same positions are held regarding how the Zionists dealt 
with the issue of the DPs after the war. 
The second chapter will outline the role of the 
refugees and DPs in Zionist strategy and rhetoric. Although 
the Jewish disaster could be turned into "political 
leverage," as Ben-Gurion had said, too much stress on the 
needs of the refugees or, after the war, the DPs, threatened 
to undermine basic Zionist philosophy. Zionists had 
portrayed the state as the solution for all Jews, present 
and future. If Zionists placed too much emphasis on the 
needs of one particular group of people, the argument that 
the Jewish state was for all Jews would be weakened. Also, 
Zionist strategists knew that they were gambling by linking 
the needs of the DPs to the creation of the state. If a 
different haven were found for the DPs, their argument that 
a Jewish state was needed for the survivors of the Holocaust 
would be destroyed, and so would the chances of creating a 
state. Nevertheless, Zionist strategists recognized that the 
needs of these people formed their best argument to win the 
support of America and later the U.N.. In order to present 
the Zionist argument strongly enough, Zionist strategists 
were forced to employ a tactic which they feared would be 
turned against them. 
The heart of the second chapter was culled from primary 
material. Other than a few brief treatments, I was unable to 
locate a secondary source that effectively addressed the 
subject. However, numerous secondary sources touched on 
aspects of the issue. Shabtai Teveth outlined Ben-Gurion's 
attitude toward the inclusion of the refugees and DPs in the 
argument for the state. The Israeli scholar, Yehuda Bauer, 
1n The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness (1979) and 
Flight and Rescue: Brichah (1970) briefly discussed how the 
Zionists used the presence of the DPs to "cultivate a 
receptive American public." The American public became an 
instrumental ally in the political battle to create the 
Jewish state. Two other works deserve mention: the American 
scholar Doreen Bierbrier, in an article for the American 
Jewish Historical Quarterly outlined the role of the AZEC 
(American Zionist Emergency Council) and the Israeli 
scholar, Michael Cohen, in Palestine and the Great Powers 
(1982) established the major role that the Exodus incident 
had in promoting the Zionist case. 
A description of the DPs, their camps, and the Zionist 
organization of the camps in the period from the end of the 
Europen war, May 1945 to the creation of Israel May 1948, 
will be the subject of the third chapter. Of special 
importance is the discussion of where the DPs actually 
wanted to go. Truman's Palestine policy was based on the 
findings of the Harrison report which maintained that the 
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vast majority of the DPs wanted to go to Palestine. Truman, 
therefore, supported opening Palestine's borders to the DPs 
against the wishes of Great Britain. This chapter will 
investigate the assumptions of the Harrison report, and 
subsequent reports. 
Several works disagree over whether the majority of the 
DPs wanted to go to Palestine or not. The authors generally 
generally split on this issue along political lines. Until 
recently, Zionists have concurred with the Harrison and 
later reports that the great majority of DPs wanted 
Palestine: especially Judah Nadich and Leo Schwarz who both 
wrote first-hand accounts of the DPs in 1953, (also see 
chapter 3 footnote #45 for a list of different works which 
assume the validity of the Harrison report). The non-
Zionists Malcolm Proudfoot in European Refugees (1956), 
Alfred Lilienthal, and Richard Stevens said otherwise. In 
1970, dissent from the original Zionist opinion was voiced 
by the Israeli scholar, Yehuda Bauer, who admitted that by 
late 1947 about half of the DPs wanted to go to the United 
States. Bauer, however, continued to say that most had 
originally wanted to go to Palestine but since their zeal 
had faded over time, they now wanted to go to the United 
States. Michael Cohen, in 1982, agreed with Bauer that half 
of the DPs had wanted to go to the United States, but Cohen 
dispensed with Bauer's opinion that that desire had evolved 
later. Peter Grose, in 1983, outlined major problems with 
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the Harrison report. Although these sources have provided 
some of the information for this chapter, most of it comes 
from primary sources. 
Only 30,000 of the 250,000 Jewish DPs were actually 
"survivors of the concentration camps." Over 150,000 of the 
whole figure came from Poland in a movement called the 
"Brichah," the Flight. The fourth chapter will show how this 
movement, in large part, was a result of the promptings and 
guidance of a Zionist underground commanded by the Mossad (a 
secret branch of the Jewish Agency.) This underground 
organization also assumed the name "Brichah." Brichah 
operatives encouraged the exodus from Poland in order to 
amass a large number of Jews in the American zone of 
occupied Germany. Ben-Gurion had hoped to get a quarter 
million there, which would "create a political fact" and put 
pressure on the Americans to support a Jewish state as the 
solution. 
The flight from Poland came, to a large degree, from 
Jewish fear of continued anti-Semitism, and from a desire to 
start over in a land unclouded by memories of horror. There 
is little debate over this fact. However, there is a debate 
over how much the Zionists encouraged that flight. Yehuda 
Bauer, while denying that the Zionists actively encouraged 
the flight, lays out, in great detail, the framework of a 
secret organization designed to assist in such a flight. 
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Leonard Dmnerstein in America and the Survivors of the 
Holocaust (1982) agreed with Bauer that Jews left Poland 
almost solely because of the anti-Semitism there. Tom Segev, 
however, in 1949, The First Israelis (1986) established that 
Mossad operatives routinely encouraged terror tactics, to 
get Jews to leave Arab countries in 1948-1950. He also hints 
that similar tactics had been used in Poland earlier. There 
is substantial evidence that concurs with Segev, concerning 
the Brichah from Poland. 
The DPs were vital to Zionist strategies. It became 
imperative that they be kept in Europe to promote the 
creation of the Jewish state until it had been created and 
they had been brought to it. The epilogue will briefly 
consider evidence which points to deliberate attempts by the 
Zionists to sabotage alternative immigration options. 
This study ties together a number of component parts 
found in the secondary literature. It differs from most of 
the pro-Zionist literature in that it maintains only about 
one half of the DPs truly wanted to go to Palestine and 
that there were viable alternatives for the DPs which could 
have materialized if the Zionists had backed them (or not 
opposed them.) Most of the literature does not make such a 
strong tie between the DPs and the Zionist arguments for 
statehood. Since most of the secondary sources which 
maintain positions similar to mine do so only cursorily, I 
felt that the subject demanded a fuller treatment. 
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Notes 
1.) Shabtai Teveth. Ben-Gurion, The Burning Ground. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1987, p.854. 
2 . ) ibid, p.855. 
3.) David S. Wyman. The Abandonment of the Jews. New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1984, p.177. 
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Chapter One 
American Zionism and Rescue 
During World War II, Zionists had little to gain and 
much to lose by pressing for rescue legislation which did 
not include Palestine. If Jewish refugees found shelter in 
countries other than Palestine, the argument that only 
Palestine could truly provide haven for the Jews of the 
world would be obscured and the status of Palestine as the 
Jewish Homeland put in question. Politicians everywhere, 
especially in the U.S., might think: that there were 
solutions for the Jewish problem other than the formation of 
a Jewish state in Palestine. In addition, the tragedy of the 
Jews under Hitler proved the Zionist point. The Zionists did 
not want to detract from the fact that Jews were again being 
persecuted. They wanted the world to see that there would be 
no peace for the Jews until they had their own state. The 
point had to be made that this latest disaster was only one 
in a long line of disasters stretching from the dispersion. 
In the past, Jews had always settled for temporary solutions 
and therefore always reaped the inevitable anti-Semitism 
which remained just under the surface in every Gentile Cul­
ture. The war, and the actions of the Nazis, brought home 
the full dimension of the Jewish problem.There was also only 
a limited amount of time, money, and man-power with which to 
bring the state into being. The state had to come first. 
Repeatedly, Zionist leadership chose to focus on building 
12 
the state at the expense of immediate rescue. 
Peter Grose, in Israel in the Mind of America, writes: 
"As late as 1943, when the right of immigration had become a 
rallying cry of a nearly united American Jewry, proposals 
for the right of immigration to the United States were roun-
1 
dly shouted down." Grose maintains that American Jewish 
leaders rejected increased Jewish immigration to America 
primarily because they "were mindful that a renewed flow of 
immigration would only repeat the social agonies their fath-
2 
ers had known and intensify the crippling unemployment." 
But there were other reasons as well. American Jewish lead­
ers, primarily Zionist, continued to resist greater Jewish 
immigration into the United States until well after the 
creation of Israel. Grose might as well have said that 
"proposals for the right of immigration to the United States 
were roundly shouted down as late as 1948, until all those 
who would go to Israel had gone." The tensions between 
Zionism and Kefugeeism ran from the beginning of Nazi 
supremacy in Germany in 1933 through the creation of the 
3 
State of Israel. Because this tension played such an 
important role in shaping Zionist strategies, it is 
important to consider the Zionist war-time record. The first 
issue to investigate is whether sincere effort was expended 
in finding alternative locations for the resettlement of 
Jews fleeing from Nazi persecution. Did Zionist leaders 
actively pursue rescue operations which would not directly 
13 
benefit Zionism? 
Historians of Zionism generally maintain that there was 
no need for Zionist leadership to resist immigration to the 
other countries. No nation would receive Jews fleeing from 
Europe anyway. For the most part this assertion holds true. 
However, some potential refuge sites were not explored with 
enough vigor. Zionism's failure to pursue some of these 
options troubled one of the American Zionist leaders, Rabbi 
Steven Wise. Grose writes: 
One of the most painful memories burdening the 
conscience of American Jewry is the resettlement drama 
of 19 38-1942....The sense of guilt lingering among 
American Jews is not that they failed to rescue their 
besieged brethren in Europe,...it is rather that too 
many were unready or unwilling even to take the risk of 
trying. (4. ) 
The "resettlement drama" centered around the search for a 
haven for Europe's refugees. 
Franklin Roosevelt was keenly interested in finding a 
temporary haven for Europe's refugees. He appointed a "geo­
graphical task force" to explore possible sites around the 
world for the resettlement of the Jews of Europe. They came 
up with hundreds of options. Some of these included Northern 
Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Nyasaland, Angola, Kenya, Cuba, Ethio­
pia, northwestern Brazil, Santo Domingo, Bolivia, Mexico, 
5 
and British Guiana. None of these sites was guaranteed to 
provide a refuge for the Jews of Europe, but many showed 
potential promise which might have been fanned to life if 
14 
the American Zionist leadership had been more supportive. 
One of Roosevelt's major dificulties was gaining a 
consensus of support from Jewish leaders, the majority of 
whom, by the middle of the war, were staunchly Zionist and 
opposed to any project other than Palestine. The Zionist 
leadership split into two camps over how much to to comprom­
ise Zionist goals for the sake of rescue. Rabbi Stephen Wise 
and Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, each in multiple Zionist lead­
ership roles, began to feud over this issue. Silver and his 
partisans minimized the "immediate problem" of saving the 
Jews of Europe as such attempts only seemed to side-step the 
larger issue: "For centuries, Jews had ignored the under­
lying causes of their distress to concern themselves only 
with 'immediate problems'", one of his associates argued in 
1943. "Had there been a Jewish state, either a Hitler would 
not have arisen in our time, or if one had, we might have 
had a country under Jewish control in which the Jews of 
6 
Germany and other lands could have been received." The 
concern to find a lasting solution for the Jewish problem 
impelled Silver and his associates, as it did Ben-Gurion, to 
place the gaining of a Jewish state above the immediate 
needs of those Jews suffering from Nazi persecution. Rabbi 
Wise and his partisans, however, wanted to compromise on 
7 
this issue in order to save lives. The difference between 
Wise and Silver can be seen in their response to the 
International Colonization Society. Formed in 1938, it 
15 
sought to provide Jews of Europe with new homes wherever 
they could be found. Although Rabbi Steven Wise was an early 
supporter, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver refused to pledge a 
single dollar for resettlement, lest Palestine get the 
8 
"short end of the bargain." 
Any project which did not gain the support of Jewish 
leaders was doomed to fail even before it started. This fate 
9 
befell many of the early projects for resettlement. Grose 
writes: 
Wise himself confessed, long after it was over, to a 
"harrowing sense of guilt" that if perhaps the Zionist 
movement had been more willing to compromise long-term 
goals for immediate needs, many of Hitler's victims 
might have survived....Other Zionists argue to this 
day, as they did at the time, that none of the 
resettlement sites stood a chance of success 
anyway.(10.) 
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In 1940 Roosevelt sent a friend, Morris Ernst , to 
arrange a deal whereby Great Britain would take in a large 
number of European refugees. Roosevelt hoped that if Britain 
allowed a large number of refugees to immigrate, then the 
Commonwealth would follow suit, and finally that the 
American congress could be "educated to go back to our 
traditional position of asylum." Ernst went to London with 
the proposal. Churchill responded favorably and Ernst re­
ported back to Roosevelt. Roosevelt, in turn, began explora­
tory talks with different Jewish leaders. Apparently, how­
ever, these leaders did not support the plan. Ernst, in his 
autobiography So. Far So Good, pointed out why the plan 
lb 
failed: 
. . . it did not work out. I do not intend to quote 
FDR or even suggest that my appraisal of the defeat 
would agree in every detail with his. But to me it 
seemed that the failure of the leading Jewish groups to 
support with zeal this immigration program may have 
caused the President not to push forward with it at 
that time. I talked to many people active m Jewish 
organizations. I suggested the plan. I made it clear 
that no Jews or other people in Europe would be 
compelled to go anywhere and certainly not to any 
assigned nation....I was amazed and even felt insulted 
when active Jewish leaders decried, sneered then 
attacked me as if I was a traitor. At one dinner party 
I was openly accused of furthering this plan of freer 
immigration in order to undermine political Zionism. 
Those Jewish groups which favored opening our doors 
gave little more than lip service to the Roosevelt 
program. Zionist friends of mine opposed it. (12.) 
Alfred Lilienthal in What Price Israel quoted a speech 
which Ernst gave in Cincinnati in 1950, after the 
publication of Ernst's autobiography. In this speech Ernst 
reported the conversation he had with FDR after returning 
from his mission to London: 
Ernst: "We are at home plate. That little island 
on a properly representative program of a World 
Immigration Budget, will match the United States up to 
150,000 . " 
Roosevelt: "150,000 to England--150,000 to match 
that in the United States--pick up 200,000 or 300,000 
elsewhere, and we can start with half a million of 
these oppressed people." 
A week later, or so, Mr. Ernst and his wife again 
visited the President. 
Roosevelt (turning to Mrs. Ernst): "Margaret, 
can't you get me a Jewish Pope? I cannot stand it any 
more. I have to be careful that when Stevie Wise leaves 
the White House he doesn't see Joe Proskauer [President 
of the American Jewish Committee] on the way in." Then, 
to Mr. Ernst: "Nothing doing on the program. We can't 
put it over because the dominant Jewish leadership 
won't stand for it." 
"It's impossible! Why?" asked Ernst. 
17 
Roosevelt: "They are right from their point of 
view. The Zionist movement knows that Palestine is, and 
will be for some time a remittance society. They know 
that they can raise vast sums for Palestine by saying 
to donorsThere is no other place for this poor Jew to 
go.' But if there is a world political asylum for all 
people irrespective of race, creed or color, they 
cannot raise their money. Then the people who do not 
want to give the money will have an excuse to say 'What 
do you mean, there is no place they can go but 
Palestine? They are the preferred wards of the 
world . ' " (13 . ) 
In light of David Wyman's recent book The Abandonment of the 
Jews, which maligns Roosevelt for not having done enough for 
the Jews during WWII, it is interesting to note that at 
least one fairly comprehensive attempt to rescue victims of 
the holocaust, initiated by Roosevelt, should be stillborn 
because Zionist leaders feared that it would hurt their 
efforts. 
The Zionists had a difficult road to travel during 
WWII. Zionism assurred that anti-Semitism would always be 
present in the world and that temporary solutions were 
distractions. "Zionist doctrine had long required 
unremitting pressure for Jewish settlement in Palestine 
and only Palestine. Proposals over the years for Jewish 
resettlement elsewhere were regarded as diversions, 
detracting from the campaign for a national homeland.... This 
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raised questions, however, as the Nazi threat grew." Many 
Zionist leaders continued to reject alternate resettlement 
sites even after the news of the holocaust became public in 
IS 
November 1942. The battle between the American Zionists 
18 
and the Revisionist Zionists led by Peter Bergson reveals 
how the Zionists, even in the face of the news of the holo­
caust, were still willing to view resettlement options as 
16 
divers ions. 
In 1942 emissaries of the Revisionist Irgun came to the 
United States to raise funds for Irgun and to build support 
17 
for a Jewish army in the Middle East. Following the re­
lease of the news of the holocaust in November 1942, Bergson 
and his associates decided to drop their original goal of 
raising money for the Irgun and focus their attention on 
rescue• 
Bergson's group sponsored an Emergency Conference, held 
July 20-25, 1943. The conferees were to consider different 
methods of rescue which would not detract from the military 
effort. Although the Conference would publicize the need for 
new legislation for the rescue of European refugees, the 
American Zionists tried to undermine it. A staff-member of 
the World Jewish Conference acquired the minutes from the 
planning session for the Emergency Conference and gave them 
to Wise. Wise then tried to dissuade some of the scheduled 
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speakers from appearing. 
The Emergency Conference proved a success. It drew over 
fifteen hundred participants and laid out inclusive rescue 
plans. The conferees determined that much could be done 
without hindering the war effort. The most important aspect 
of their plans was the formation of a Government Agency 
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which would oversee and direct any rescue efforts. The con­
ference also launched the creation of a new organization, 
the Emergency Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe, 
which was to promote and pursue rescue. The Emergency Com­
mittee was able to enlist the support of many important 
allies: Ben Hecht, a journalist and Hollywood scriptwriter; 
congressman Will Rogers and Senator Guy Gillette, among 
others. 
The Emergency Committee soon emerged as a major threat 
to the authority of the American Zionists. The Emergency 
Committee to Save the Jewish People of Europe stressed 
19 
rescue first. Rescue superseded every other issue. This 
philosophy directly challenged the primary orientation of 
the Jewish Agency / World Zionist Organization as embodied 
20 
in the Biltmore program. Irgun and Jewish Agency 
philosophy disagreed on how a Jewish state could be won. The 
Irgun (the Revisionists) believed that a Jewish state would 
come about only through an armed conflict while the Jewish 
Agency planned for a diplomatic solution. Since the Jewish 
Agency hoped for a diplomatic solution, it had to marshall 
all its diplomatic currency toward this end; it could not 
squander the huge moral argument of the survivors of the 
holocaust. If temporary haven were found for the refugees, 
as the Emergency Committee recommended, the overarching 
"Jewish problem" would be diluted, making the argument for a 
20 
Jewish State less compelling. The American historian, Aaron 
Berman, wrote "The need for a postwar haven for Jewish refu­
gees [became] the major Zionist argument when dealing with 
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the Christian world." If the Emergency Committee proved 
successful in its rescue attempts which did not demand that 
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Palestine was the haven, then the force of the Zionist 
argument for a final haven would have been diluted. On the 
other hand, according to the Irgun outloox, setting up 
temporary refuge would not affect the course of the armed 
conflict. A focus on rescue then would only help the 
Revisionist position and impair the mainstream Zionist 
pos1tion. 
The Emergency Committee also threatened the Zionist 
support base in the United States. A major concern of the 
American Zionists was that the Bergsonites could build a 
rival Zionist organization which would draw funds and mem­
bers away from them and "disrupt progress toward realization 
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of the Jewish State." 
The Bergsonites actively pursued a number of ambitious 
pieces of rescue legislation and they sponsored several 
events designed to spur American citizens to greater action 
to save the victims of Hitler. The American Zionists resist­
ed every step that the Emergency Committee took. Often, 
they sabotaged action initiated by the Emergency Committee 
which could have resulted in help for the oppressed Jews in 
Europe, as the following examples will illustrate. 
On October 6, 1943, the Emergency Committee, with coop­
eration of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis and the Union of 
Grand Rabbis, organized a march to the Capitol where five 
prominent rabbis hoped to present the President with a peti­
tion asking for action on the issue of rescue. The 
President, however, did not meet them. Wyman lays at least 
part of the blame on the opposition with which mainstream 
Zionists greeted the Bergsonites. "Some Jewish leaders, in 
cooperation with Samuel Rosenman (who frequently advised the 
President on Jewish issues) [and was his chief speech 
writer], sought to prevent the march, then to influence 
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Roosevelt to ignore it." 
One of the most sensational attempts by the Emergency 
25 
Committee was a resolution introduced on November 9, 1943 
calling on the President to create "a commission of 
diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and 
effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the 
surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the 
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hands of Nazi Germany." The commission would set up 
temporary camps in Spain, Portugal, North Africa, 
Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey which would provide 
temporary sanctuary for any survivors who happened to escape 
to them. As Wyman describes, the "Kescue Resolution" became 
a major battleground between Bergson's Emergency Committee 
and the political action committee of the American Zionists, 
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the American Zionist Emergency Council -- AZEC : 
The Emergency Committee worked almost alone for 
the passage of the Rescue Resolution. Zionist leaders, 
acting through the American Jewish Conference, even 
hampered its progress. When they first learned that tne 
Emergency Committee planned to introduce the 
resolution, they pressed its sponsors in Congress to 
replace it with one closer to their own specifications. 
After that failed and the Emergency Committee's 
proposal was introduced, they maneuvered behind the 
scenes for addition of an amendment calling for opening 
Palestine to Jewish refugees. When this attempt 
floundered, they carried the issue to the hearing room 
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.(27.) 
Wise and others in AZEC felt that the most serious 
problem with the resolution was that it failed to include a 
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demand for free Jewish immigration to Palestine. Congress­
man Will Rogers Jr. responded to Wise: 
This resolution was specifically drawn up to eliminate 
Palestine. Any time you inject that into the refugee 
situation it reacts to the harm of the refugees.(29.) 
Senator Guy Gillette, who had introduced the resolution, 
discussed the opposition he had received from Zionist 
leaders: 
These people used every effort, every means at 
their disposal, to block the resolution...CThey] tried 
to defeat it by offering an amendment, insisting on an 
amendment to it that would raise the question, the 
controversial question of Zionism or anti-Zionism,... 
or anything that might stop and block the action that 
we were seeking.(30.) 
Why did the American Zionist leadership resist a 
resolution which could have been benefitted Jews still in 
great danger in Europe? Wyman argues: 
The key reason was their extreme animosity toward its 
sponsor, the Emergency Committee.... They recognized 
that success for the resolution would bring prestige. 
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additional popular support, and more strength to the 
Bergsonite faction. If they could have replaced or 
amended the Rescue Resolution, and thus claimed it as 
their own, they would probably have supported it. But 
their attempts in that direction failed.(31.) 
Wyman assumes that the AZEC would have supported the Rescue 
Resolution if it had sponsored it. That assumption ignores 
the ideological barrier the AZEC faced when dealing with any 
rescue position which did not focus on Palestine. For the 
Zionists any rescue attempt which did not focus on Pales­
tine detracted from Palestine and thus weakened the Zionist 
movement. Wyman's explanation does not come to terms with 
the essence of the problem. As Aaron Berman points out, the 
Revisionists and maistream Zionists had fundamental 
ideological differences of how to best achieve a Jewish 
State. Since the Emergency Committee was founded on 
Revisionist ideology which did not require them to prove 
the need for a Jewish state, the Emergency Committee could 
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avoid "the pitfalls of demanding Jewish statehood" which 
doomed any rescue legislation to failure because the British 
(and the Arabs) would not have stood for it. The mainstream 
Zionists, however, needed to demand a Jewish state in their 
appeals for rescue since they needed to prove that a Jewish 
state was necessary. The AZEC would not have supported any 
rescue legislation which did not include a call for a Jewish 
state, leaving AZEC uniquely unsuited to pursue any rescue 
legislation. 
On January 22, 1944, two days before the Rescue 
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Resolution came up for a vote, when all indications pointed 
to its imminent passage, President Roosevelt issued the 
order to create the War Refugee Board. The WRB accomplished 
what the Rescue Resolution was asking for. Without question 
the Rescue Resolution was responsible for its creation. A 
major piece of rescue legislation came about because a small 
and relatively insignificant lobby pushed it. Wyman muses 
over this : 
The fact that the tiny Bergsonite faction accomplished 
what it did toward the establishment of the WRB is 
compelling evidence that a major, sustained, and united 
Jewish effort could have obtained the rescue board 
earlier and insisted on its receiving greater support 
than it did.(33.) 
During the summer of 1944, the Emergency Committee 
campaigned for an extension of the Rescue Resolution. It 
wanted emergency refuge shelters established in Palestine. 
Palestine was an ideal location for anyone who was able to 
escape from Hungary, Rumania, or Bulgaria into Turkey. Under 
its plan, any Jewish person who found refuge at these camps 
would have no legal right to stay in the camps and would 
have to leave following the conclusion of the war. The plan 
would have avoided the strict immigration restrictions of 
the White Paper while still providing temporary shelter. It 
gained still more relevancy in mid-July when the Hungarian 
government offered to allow any Jew with a visa to Palestine 
to leave Hungary. 
American Zionists violently opposed the concept of 
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emergency shelters in Palestine, however. As Berman says: 
They feared that the opening of Palestine refugee 
centers, without the recognition of the refugee's 
rights to remain permanently in Palestine, would raise 
serious questions about the legitimacy of the Jewish 
claim to Palestine.(34.) 
Silver, in an AZEC Executive meeting held on March 20, 
1944, discussed the dilemma which the Bergson resolution 
raised. The minutes of that meeting report in part: 
The introduction of such a resolution would put 
our whole movement in an embarrassing situation, and we 
would be placed in the position of wanting to fight it 
but being unable to do so. We would be accused of 
preferring to keep Jews out of Palestine rather than 
yield on the Commonwealth.(35) 
The American Federation for Polish Jews sent a letter to 
Senator Robert Wagner (D-New York) on September 1, 1944 that 
said in part: 
Our opposition to the proposed resolution is based 
on the fact that we consider the establishment of such 
camps as detrimental to the conception of Palestine as 
a Jewish National Home where the Jew should enjoy 
complete freedom. The internment of Jews in camps and 
the restriction of their personal freedom, especially 
m a country whose status as a Jewish homeland has been 
supported by all democratic countries, would be a 
serious violation of the Jewish national conception. 
What should be demanded now, with the utmost 
insistence, is that Jewish refugees be admitted to 
Palestine without restriction and with no restraint 
placed upon their normal human liberties.(36.) 
The AZEC called on all those who backed the emergency 
shelter resolution to support a resolution calling for free 
Jewish immigration to Palestine instead. Senator Robert F. 
Wagner and Senator Robert Taft (R-Ohio) introduced the AZEC 
resolution to Congress in January 1944. This resolution, 
however, was tabled until after the war beause Henry 
Stimson, the American Secretary of War, insisted that it 
would harm the war effort by making the Arabs even more 
disenchanted with the Allies. Stimson feared that the pas­
sage of the resolution "could be the spark to start it 
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off." The resolution was finally re-introduced and pas­
sed after the war. In sum, the AZEC fought against the pas­
sage of the emergency shelter resolution because they saw it 
as a threat to tne concept of a Jewish State. 
One year earlier, under the pressure of the growing 
strength of the Bergsonites, the Zionists called for a con­
ference of "all Jews." On August 29, 1943, a month after the 
creation of the Emergency Committee, the American Jewish 
Conference convened at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. 
While the Emergency Committee had stressed "rescue first," 
having dropped its original goal of raising support for a 
Jewish army in the Middle East, the American Jewish Confer­
ence did not even include rescue on the original agenda. The 
original agenda included only two topics of discussion: 
postwar Jewish rights and Palestine. The rescue issue was 
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only added later after Jewish public opinion demanded it. 
Before the news of extermination became known, Zionist 
strategists had planned how to gain maximum support in the 
United States. They knew that the best opportunity for crea­
ting a Jewish state would come immediately after the war 
27 
when a fluid International political situation would allow 
the possibility for creating a new state. The continued 
revelation of Jewish problems in Europe and in Palestine 
also contributed to a sense that if a Jewish state was to be 
created, it should be done while the awareness of the Jewish 
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need was fresh. 
American Zionists first needed to agree on an agenda, 
before they could attempt to marshall American support. They 
accomplished this at the Biltmore Conference which met in 
New York in May 1942. The Biltmore Program, the result of 
the Conference, provided for a unified statement of purpose 
for all American Zionists. However, the Zionists also needed 
to enlist as many non-Zionists as possible. They chose to 
gain the support of all Jewry by sponsoring another confer­
ence, this time for all the Jews in America. The conferees 
would work out possible solutions for Jewish postwar prob­
lems. The main value of a further conference, however, was 
that it would create a unified front which would be 
invaluable in future negotiations over the creation of a 
Jewish state. Chaim Weizmann, the president of the World 
Zionist Organization, and Stephen Wise, President of the 
American Jewish Congress and Chairman of the AECZA, knowing 
that most non-Zionist organizations would not respond to a 
Zionist invitation, convinced Henry Monsky, the president of 
B'nai B'rith, to call for the conference. Since B'nai B'rith 
and Monsky were not avowed Zionists, non-Zionists would be 
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more prone to respond to his invitation. 
Monsky's invitation proved very successful as all the 
major Jewish organizations ultimately agreed to come, al­
though some did have misgivings that the Conference would 
only serve Zionist goals. Their fears proved true when the 
Zionists, by successfully manipulating the elections of the 
delegates, were able to get a decisive majority of the 
seats. The final distribution of delegates to the conference 
demonstrated the effectiveness of Zionist strategy. Eighty 
percent of the delegates were "avowed Zionists," and only 
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..few were outright opponents. 
The slanted distribution of seats caused dissension. 
The American Jewish Committee (AJC) ultimately withdrew. 
Rabbi Silver received a letter from the AJC which explained 
why it had withdrawn from the conference. Silver summarized 
the letter at an AZEC meeting: "They felt the conference was 
an unrepresentative body" because of the methods which were 
chosen to elect the local delegates. The AJC also felt that 
the "conference was not a true conference in that the dele­
gates were all instructed... to vote in a body" and that 
"there was very little opportunity for any expression of 
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opposition." The unrepresentative character of the confer­
ence caused two organizations to withdraw before it began. 
These organizations, Agudath Israel and the Union of Ortho­
dox Rabbis, were also disturbed by the American Jewish Con­
29 
ference's failure to place rescue on the agenda. Agudath 
Israel had repeatedly urged, to no avail, that rescue be a 
major issue of discussion. The issue of rescue was finally 
put on the agenda, after repeated insistence by the Jewish 
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Labor Committee, only a month before the conference began. 
The American Jewish Conference (not to be confused with 
the American Jewish Committee [AJC] which was non-Zionist in 
orientation) began at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York 
on August 29 and lasted until September 2, 1943. At the 
conference, speaker after speaker stressed the need for 
unity and called for a moderate position with regard to 
Palestine. Most called for an end to the White Paper and 
open Jewish immigration into Palestine. They hoped that by 
presenting a unified voice, Britain and the United States 
might be more inclined to act. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, 
however, dispensed with compromise and pushed for the full 
acceptance of the Biltmore program. Deemphasizing the need 
for immediate rescue, Silver stressed that Jews had been 
involved in a "millenial tragedy" which had stretched from 
the dispersion up till that moment. The only solution was a 
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"Jewish Commonwealth." The overwhelming majority of 
Zionist delegates thunderously approved. In great emotional 
affirmation people cried and sang the Zionist anthem 
"Hatikvah." The tone of the conference was set; immediate 
rescue was displaced. 
Some tried to revive the issue of rescue but ultimately 
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were unsuccessful. Robert Goldman, a longtime Zionist from 
Cincinnati, disagreed with Silver. He insisted that imme­
diate rescue was needed as well as a long-term solution for 
Jewish homelessness: 
The immediate problem,...is rescue; I don't care what 
else you say or how you characterize it, or what you 
say of me for saying it, that is the immediate problem 
and that is the problem we should be concerned 
with. (45 . ) 
Goldman went on to warn the Palestine committee that a de­
mand for a commonwealth would only harden the resolve of the 
Arabs and British and ultimately harm rescue efforts, but 
his warnings were to no avail. The conference overwhelmingly 
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passed Silver's maximalist proposal. 
The other two issues on the conference's agenda re­
ceived very short shrift. The issue of postwar Jewish rights 
was shunted off to "the experts" and a newly formed rescue 
committee succeeded only in producing a resolution. No plans 
were made to do any concrete work on rescue. Two members of 
the rescue committee expressed their frustration over its 
lack of action. A woman delegate from Minnesota said: 
If it is just a question of taking all the 
programs that have been presented on this subject 
before, by other groups, and by existing committees, 
and of taking ideas that we know already exist, and 
simply getting them in draft form, there is no need to 
bring us here from all parts of the United States.(47.) 
A man from Chicago added: 
We are told that nothing has to be done, that 
everything has been done.... Ladies and gentlemen, the 
mere fact that [the] committee that organized this 
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Conference was forced by pressure of Jewish public 
opinion to put this rescue question on the agenda 
speaks for itself, that the Jews of America have felt 
that not enough...was done to rescue our brethren in 
Europe. (48 . ) 
On October 28, 1943, the AZEC issued a statement de­
fending itself against the criticism of the American Jewish 
Committee (the anti-Zionist group which had withdrawn from 
the conference): 
The American Jewish Committee complains that the 
conference subordinated all other issues to the 
question of Palestine. This is absurd. If Palestine's 
future played a major role in the conference and 
absorbed in a large measure the interests of the 
delegates, it is precisely because they realized that 
Palestine offers the one great constructive solution 
both to the problems of immediate rescue and the 
problem of Jewish national homelessness.(49.) 
The militant Zionist position prevailed in the 
Conference. A concern for the Jewish State outweighed the 
needs of the countless individuals who might have been saved 
had an aggressive rescue program been adopted by the 
conference. 
A letter from Arthur Sulzberger, the Publisher for the 
New York Times to Rabbi Silver sums up the attitude of many 
non-Zionists after the conference was over: 
If I had been in the American Jewish Committee, the 
Committee would never have sent delegates to the 
American Jewish Conference, for it was obvious to me 
from the beginning that the Conference was a Zionist 
maneuver -- and I have no lack of respect for your 
political astuteness.(50.) 
Zionist ideology called for unswerving allegiance* The 
task of creating the state demanded total dedication. There 
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was no room for distractions which might sap the strength of 
Zionist support and slow the process of revealing the Jewish 
problem to the world. If the Jewish people were to have 
peace and security, they needed to have a state. In order to 
have a state, all other considerations had to be secondary--
including the rescue of Jewish people in Europe. 
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Chapter Two 
Refuoeelam or Zionism? 
The DPa in Zionist Theory and Rhetoric 
The Zionists linked the immediate homeiessness of the 
Jewish refugees with the creation of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. This linkage proved to be the most effective 
strategy for bringing about a Jewish state in Palestine. B y  
emphasizing the need of the refugees, and by "creating a 
moral cry for Justice", the Zionists were able to capitalize 
on the tragedy and "cultivate a receptive American public." 
Yehuda Bauer, in his short book The Jewish Emergence 
from Powerlessness, writes: 
How was the emergence from powerlessness achieved? What 
made the British go to the U.N.? The decisive influence 
was American pressure which prevented Britain from 
implementing her anti-Zionist policies. America's 
pressure in turn was motivated by the presence of the 
Holocaust survivors in the DP camps. This pressure was 
kept up on American decision-makers by American Jewry, 
cultivating a receptive American public. So the 
establishment of the State of Israel and the consequent 
achievement of a political power base for the Jewish 
people was made possible, to a large degree, by the 
Jews of the Diaspora; the survivors who organized 
groups like the Brichah; and American Jewry. (1.) 
For the Zionist strategists the issue of the DPs served 
not only to "cultivate a receptive American public," 
thereby influencing American decision-makers to apply 
pressure on the British government, but also to influence 
the General Assembly debate over the UNSCOP (United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine) partition plan in the fall 
37 
of 1947. The world still reeled over the revelation of the 
horrors of the death camps. 
The ending of the war revealed the full extent of the 
horrors of Nazi genocide finally uncovered as the conquering 
armies liberated the death camps. This revelation fueled a 
sense of moral outrage and inevitable guilt that demanded 
action; demanded that some justice should be meted out. This 
was done both in a positive and in a negative sense: in a 
negative sense, the natural targets were the Nazis 
themselves, thus the Nuremberg Trials; in the positive 
sense, the survivors of the Holocaust. It would have been 
altogether natural for the world to seek justice for the 
survivors even if the Zionists had not been there to stoke 
the fires. However, the Zionists had seen the political 
potential of disaster even before the war and therefore were 
not at a loss about what approach to take after it. Tne 
knowledge that there were still some 250,000 survivors left 
in squalid camps in Europe impelled humanitarian Americans 
and later UN emissaries to seek to address the situation. 
Justice for the DPs was a potent argument. Politicians in 
the West felt compelled to help in some way. The argument 
that the sufferings of the Jewish people demanded a Jewish 
state did not start with the end of the war, however. 
Even before the war, Zionist thinkers had understood 
that the world would have to see the relevance of the Jewish 
problem before it would countenance a Jewish homeland. Not 
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only would Gentile decision-makers need to experience a 
Jewish catastrophe, but so would Jews. As early as March 
1928, Ben-Gurion had told the Histadrut Executive Committee 
in Palestine, "In order to start a movement in America, a 
2 
great disaster or upheaval is needed." The Israeli 
scholar, Shabtai Teveth outlines how Ben-Gurion planned on 
using disaster for political gain: 
Since Hitler came to power, Ben-Gurion maintained it 
was imperative to "turn a disaster... into a productive 
force" and asserted that "distress" could also serve as 
"political leverage": "the destruction" was a factor in 
"expediting our enterprise and it is in our interests 
to use Hitler, [who] has not reduced our strength for 
the building of the Country.(3.) 
Ben-Gurion felt that the world would not support the 
idea of a Jewish homeland unless it finally saw that the 
"Jewish problem" would not go away. In fact, the world would 
not even recognize that there was a "Jewish problem" without 
some disaster that would demand its attention. Nor would the 
world Jewish community be moved from complacency without a 
disaster which would force it to agree that anti-Semitism 
was pandemic. A disaster would reveal that they would not 
truly be safe until there was a Jewish sanctuary. In Ben-
Gurion's mind. Hitler proved the Zionist point. 
Most non-Jews and even a large number of Jews did not 
believe that what had happened in Germany was bound to 
happen again. For them Hitler was an anomaly. Most 
Americans did not even countenance that there might be a 
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"Jewish problem" in "free" countries such as the United 
Kingdom or the United States and so naturally were not 
4 
really convinced of the need for a Jewish homeland. Most 
humanitarian-minded people were concerned primarily with how 
to rescue as many individuals as possible and did not seem 
overly concerned with the long range "Jewish problem." For 
these humanitarians, the only really important issue was 
rescue. They wanted to save individuals during the war and 
then find a suitable home for them after the war -- and this 
home did not necessarily have to be Palestine. The Zionists, 
however, had to prove that Palestine was indispensable. They 
had to convince the American public that no other answer 
would ever solve the real Jewish problem -- statelessness. 
Convincing the American public of the Zionist position 
became the key to gaining the support of the American 
government which in turn was the key to forcing the British 
to acquiesce to Zionist demands. 
After the war, Zionist strategists wanted to capitalize 
on the sympathy of a world horrified by mass slaughter 
while at the same time addressing the tendency of most of 
those people to think in terms of immediate rescue only. 
The Zionist organ New Palestine stressed the tragedy and 
assigned the guilt to the Christian nations. 
The whole world, whether friendly or hostile, is aware 
of the overwhelming tragedy of the Jewish peoples, it 
is aware of the universal guilt of Christendom in 
causing this tragedy.(5.) 
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Following the Harrison report in August of 1945, which 
maintained that a vast majority of the DPs wanted to go to 
Palestine, the need of these people was linked to the issue 
of Palestine. Thereafter, Zionist leaders continued to 
employ the "rescue issue" as the surest way, as Bauer put 
it, to "cultivate American receptivity" to Zionist goals. 
Americans would support a Jewish state if they believed that 
the DPs sincerely wanted to go to Palestine and were denied 
this simplest of desires because of the British support of 
Arab "feudal lords." The issue of the DPs became the 
touchstone of Zionism for most Americans. Even if they did 
not understand Zionism, (or even if they did not agree that 
American Jews needed sanctuary) they could understand the 
6 
need of the persecuted "survivors of the death camps." 
After his tour of the Displaced Persons camps in 
October 1945, Ben-Gurion summed up the course which Zionist 
strategy should take: 
In the struggle ahead we have on our side three major 
forces: the Yishuv [the Jewish community in 
Palestine] and its strengths, America, [and] the DP 
camps in Germany. The function of Zionism is not to 
help the remnant to survive in Europe, but rather to 
rescue them for the sake of the Jewish people and the 
Yishuv; the Jews of America and the DPs of Europe are 
allotted a special role in this rescue.(7.) 
On June 22, 1945, at a meeting of the Executive of the 
American Zionist Emergency Council (AZEC), Ben-Gurion said: 
The main thing now is effective intervention of the 
American Government for a practical solution of the 
Palestine problem...to achieve this end, to get the 
American Government to intervene effectively, we must 
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emphasize the gravity both of the Jewish position in 
Europe and the position in Palestine, and urge an 
immediate decision, because the matter cannot wait any 
longer.(8.) 
This sentiment was expanded in the same meeting by Judge 
Morris Rothenberg, a member of the Executive of the AZEC who 
said: 
Our position is a great deal more difficult today than 
it was a year ago. While the war was on, the tragedy of 
the Jewish people was before the eyes of the world and 
everyone felt keenly that something should be done. 
With the war at an end, people throughout the world do 
not think the Jewish question is so acute. They are not 
aware of the seriousness of the problem.(9.) 
Herman Shulman, a member of the AZEC executive continued: 
As far as the political situation is concerned, however 
regrettable, it is a fact that there is not in 
existence at this time the moral cry for justice that 
there was at the end of the last war. We should do what 
we can to see that it is created. But we must 
supplement it by political action. (10.) 
Hardly a more concise statement of strategy could be made. 
The AZEC focused on creating a "moral cry for justice," and 
on "emphasizing the gravity...of the Jewish position in 
Europe." In this way they were able to "cultivate a 
receptive American public." 
Bringing a Jewish State into being meant much more 
than simply convincing the American people, and through them 
the American government, that a Jewish state should be 
created. The Zionists also had to bring a great number of 
people into the Yishuv. Since Arabs outnumbered Jews in the 
Palestine Mandate, the Jews would not have been able to 
build a democratic form of government there without bringing 
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in many more Jews. If they tried to build a state at the 
Jewish population levels of 1933-1948, the state would have 
either been Jewish and non-democratic or democratic and non-
Jewish. The new state would also need a great influx of 
people in order to expand the economic fortunes of the state 
and to provide the necessary soldiers in order to defend its 
borders against increasingly hostile neighbors. The 
leadership in the Yishuv desperately needed more Jews to 
immigrate but the Holocaust destroyed millions who had been 
the most likely to come. After the Holocaust the Zionist 
leadership needed to encourage Jews who previously had not 
been inclined to come. 
Initially, the Zionist leadership thought that by 
increasing immigration to Palestine it could not only bring 
the people needed if the state were to survive, but put more 
pressure on Britain and the world to create a Jewish state. 
Therefore, it worked to open up the borders of Palestine. In 
an AZEC meeting on April 6, 1945, one Committee member said: 
If we insist that the gates of Palestine should be 
opened, we do so for three reasons: 1.)in answer to the 
cry of our brethren in these countries [the DPs3; 2) 
because of the demand for labor hands in Palestine; and 
3) because we see on this front one of the major 
battles in the fight for the future of Palestine.(11.; 
However, it increasingly became clear to the Zionist leaders 
that there would be no way to increase immigration 
sufficiently without having control of immigration policy. 
Great Britain would not permit enough immigration to allow 
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for a Jewish majority in Palestine. The Zionists needed to 
have a state in order to bring in a population large enough 
to sustain a state. The complexity of the problem naturally 
resulted in confusion for the Zionist leaders. How could 
they both gain more immigration but also, and more 
importantly, gain a state. 
On June 22, 1945, in a meeting of the AZEC, Goldman, 
stressed the importance of gaining a state: 
The issue is no longer that of immigration, for on the 
fundamental decision immigration will depend. It would 
be a catastrophe if they agreed to abolish the white 
paper and to admit even 100,000 immigrants without 
announcing a decision on the Jewish State, because a 
delay in obtaining that decision, even for a year, 
would mean indefinite delay. At this moment, therefore, 
we have to concentrate on the major decision.(12. ) 
Later in the same meeting Ben-Gurion agreed. 
What is our political objective? What we want now is 
not a state for the sake of having a state, but to 
bring into Palestine in the shortest possible time, in 
a year or perhaps two years, at least the first million 
Jews. In order to achieve that we need five things: 
1.) A Jewish State. A British or a Russian or an 
Arab State will not bring a million Jews into 
Palestine. 
2.) That Jews should control immigration and the 
development of Palestine. It is no good to satisfy 
oneself with a formula about Jewish immigration. If you 
want the Jews back in Palestine, you will not get them 
there in that way. Unless there is a Jewish government, 
the Jews will not be allowed in. But even assuming that 
the doors are open, it will not be enough. In Palestine 
you cannot settle unless you colonize the country and 
for that you must have control over water resources, 
land, etc....Csee footnote for the other 3 aspects] 
The only thing that will assure our future is the 
bringing of 1,000,000 Jews into Palestine. That is now 
the object of Zionism. To achieve that we need the 
state and all the other things outlined above.(13.) 
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Ben-Gurion's seemingly paradoxical statement is perfectly 
suited to the problem. He knew that the Zionists needed "the 
first million" in order for the state to survive. However, 
one million Jews would be allowed to immigrate only if the 
Jews controlled the immigration laws. The only way the Jews 
could control the immigration laws was by having their own 
state. The first issue to address, therefore, was the 
creation of a state, but, even while addressing the creation 
of a state, they needed to continually push for increased 
immigration. 
Even before this meeting, Zionist leaders had planned a 
way to promote the need to open Palestine to Jewish 
immigration. If the people in the United States knew of the 
needs of the DPs, and if they could be convinced that the 
DPs wanted to go to Palestine, then they would become 
invaluable allies for the Zionists. The American people 
would demand that the gates of Palestine be opened for the 
survivors of the Holocaust. Hoping to make the American 
people their allies, the Zionists pushed for a Presidential 
commission to study the needs of the DPs. (The formation of 
this commission, and its Zionist ties, are discussed at 
length in chapter 3.) 
In the first few months after the war, President 
Truman commissioned Earl Harrison, the Dean of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School, to study the DP 
problem in Europe. The Harrison report recommended the 
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immediate granting of 100,000 certificates of immigration to 
Palestine at a time when only about half that number of 
Jews populated the camps. In a speech to the B'nai Brith on 
November 7, 1945 Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau 
Jr., a Zionist sympathizer, stressed Harrison's point. "I am 
convinced that there is only one solution for the homeless, 
stateless Jews -- the immediate admission of at least 
100,000 to Palestine. For Palestine is the one refuge where 
they could be assured of achieving at once the status of 
14 
welcomed and respected citizens." 
After Harrison had sent his report to Truman on August 
1, 1945, Truman publicly called on the British to admit the 
100,000. The issue of admitting the 100,000 proved 
tenacious, as it became the center of Anglo-American dialog 
and dissension over Palestine. Ultimately Britain requested 
that the United States and Britain send a joint committee to 
investigate the DP camps and the capacity of Palestine to 
receive the DPs. The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 
(AACI), however, also recommended the admission of 100,000 
Jewish DPs into Palestine. 
The minutes of an AZEC meeting on May 9, 1946 reported 
that Nahum Goldman, the representative of the Jewish Agency 
to the AZEC, commented on the AACI report and, 
...emphasized the importance of the recommendation with 
regard to the immediate immigration of the 100,000. It 
was also at this moment more important to follow up 
this recommendation than to devote our attention to the 
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remainder of "the Report, not only because we have an 
opportunity to save these lives, but also because it 
would strengthen our position in Palestine. This will 
require tremendous pressure on the American Government 
and on the President m particular.(15.) 
Goldman seemed to contradict his position of a year earlier 
when he had said "it would be a catastrophe...to admit even 
100,000 immigrants without announcing a decision on the 
Jewish State." (see above) Goldman thought that the 100,000 
more Jews in Palestine would strengthen the position of the 
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Yishuv, thus strengthening the Zionist argument. In fact, 
a debate had erupted in Zionist circles over the report. The 
original figure of 100,000, which had been suggested by 
1'7 
Harrison (due to Zionist promptings) was fine for a time 
when there were only 50,000 in the camps. But the figure was 
outdated in April 1946 when there truly was 100,000 Jewish 
DPs in Europe and the strong potential of 150,000 more. Ben-
Gurion was livid with the report. In a telegram to the AZEC 
on April 22, 1946, Ben-Gurion lashed out at the AAC I report. 
He did not understand how the American members could sign 
such a "shameful document" which would lead to the 
"annihilation of Zionism" and a "British colonial-military 
state, which was no longer to be a homeland for the Jewish 
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people, and which would never become a Jewish State." This 
was not the first or last time that the Zionists would clash 
over strategy. 
The granting of the 100,000 immigration certificates 
probably would have been disastrous. Michael Cohen, in 
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Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945-1948 notes the problem 
which the issue of the 100,00 presented to the Jewish 
Agency: 
The agency was to some extent now hoisted with its 
own petard. Its original demand for the 100,000 was now 
anachronistic, but had been taken at face value by the 
committee and was regarded by many, including Truman 
himself, as a maximum, not a minimum. In effect, the 
report now condemned a majority of the DPs to remain m 
Europe!(19.) 
Although the granting of the 100,000 immigration 
certificates could have been disastrous, the Zionist 
leadership in the United States decided that it would be 
severely impolitic to refuse the offer when just earlier 
they had demanded it. Also, it was a fairly safe bet that 
the report would not be accepted since it was unlikely that 
all three parties, the Arabs, the British, and the Jews 
would agree on it. 
The issue of the 100,000 turned out to be a blessing in 
disguise for the Zionist strategists. It proved to be an 
effective means to engage the American people to pressure 
their government to act on both the DP and Palestine 
problems. The two were always paired. On June 12, 1946 the 
AZEC and the American Jewish Conference sponsored a mass 
demonstration at Madison Square Garden to demand increased 
immigration to Palestine. The AZEC prepared slogans, which 
were to be used on banners at the demonstration. The slogans 
revolved around a few central issues: Gentile guilt over the 
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Holocaust, "Attlee! (State Department!) -- Aren't 6,000,000 
Jewish Dead enough?"; the issue of the 100,000: "100,000 
Now!"; and rescue, "The Jews need rescue, not 
investigation!" or, "The 'Liberated' Jews still plead for 
20 
liberation." 
Mass rallies such as this one, and other smaller events 
across the country continued to draw attention to the needs 
of the DPs. In addition, any event organized by the A2EC and 
its numerous affiliates (local committees of the AZEC and 
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the American Christian Federation for Palestine), linked 
the DPs and the issue of Palestine. The Zionist goal of 
."cultivating a receptive American public" was being met. 
Because of numerous rallies, like the one in Madison Square 
Garden, and an effective use of the press, humanitarian-
minded Americans thought in terms of Palestine when 
considering the plight of the DPs. 
As the population of the camps grew past the 100,000 
mark, in the spring of 1946, the presence of so many 
"survivors of the Holocaust" proved invaluable in creating 
a "moral outcry" which in turn aligned American public 
opinion with the Zionist cause. Zionist strategists could 
gain much more political influence from the DPs staying in 
Europe and "putting the Americans on the spot" than they 
could bringing them to Palestine. 
The granting of 100,000 permits would have swelled the 
Jewish population in the Yishuv and taken care of the DP 
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problem for a while, but it might not have led to the 
creation of the State of Israel. If the 100,000 had been 
admitted, as the Zionist committee originally wanted, then 
the "political fact" of the masses of DPs in the American 
Zone would not have materialized. Truman wrote, "the 
Zionists ... were impatiently making my immediate objective 
(immigration of the 100,000) more difficult to obtain... They 
wanted the American government to support their aim of a 
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Jewish state in Palestine." The 100,000 had become a 
shibboleth. Rabbi Silver the Co-Chairman of the AZEC, 
reported to the American Executive of the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine, that Senator Vandenberg of Michigan had said the 
AZEC had "made a great mistake in talking about the 100,000. 
He repeated that to me again. He said, 'You directed a false 
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focus on your problem.'" The issue of "refugeeism" 
threatened to overwhelm Zionism. As Silver said, "I am happy 
that our movement has finally veered around to the point 
where we are all, or nearly all, talking of a Jewish State. 
That was always classical Zionism.... But I ask...are we 
again, in moments of desperation, going to confuse Zionism 
with refugeeism, which is likely to defeat 
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Zionism?... Zionism is not a refugee movement." 
The Zionists had a large and difficult task ahead of 
them. In the midst of untold individual suffering, the 
Zionist leadership felt it necessary to consider political 
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issues before issues of individual need, the rescue of the 
DPs. The needs of the individual had to be subordinated to 
the greater good of the whole. Palestine represented not 
just a temporary refuge but also an "eternal" redemption of 
all Jewry. Teveth writes: 
In Zionist thinking, the word 'rescue' had always 
carried a negative connotation, as it was taken to mean 
the antithesis of 'redemption' -- the code word for the 
Zionist's ideal -- implying that there were other 
solutions to the Jewish problem other than Palestine, 
or that individual distress could be alleviated while 
ignoring the problem of the people as a whole. (25.) 
An emphasis on rescue which did not stress Palestine as the 
only place of refuge and which proposed other havens, 
detracted from the ultimate solution; it addressed only 
immediate needs while making the creation of a Jewish state 
that much more difficult. An undue focus on rescue 
undermined Zionism by implying that there were other 
solutions to the Jewish problem other than Palestine; taking 
potential immigrants to places other than Palestine also 
reduced the number of future immigrants to a Jewish 
homeland, who were of the utmost importance to the creation 
and survival of the state. Teveth notes how Ben-Gurion used 
this argument: 
In his view, rescue 'for Palestine's sake' was the 
only rescue. Alternative solutions -- equal rights, 
emigration, terntorlalism, socialism-- he considered 
nothing more than 'witch doctor's medicine,' which 
would only perpetuate the condition of the Jewish 
people.(26.) 
In response to a question from Mapai's council (Mapai 
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was "the dominant political party in the Yishuv at this time) 
as to which came first, individual rescue or Zionist 
fulfillment, Ben-Gurion responded: 
Zionism in the stage of development is not primarily 
engaged in saving the individual. If along the way it 
saves a few thousand, tens of thousands, or hundreds of 
thousands of individuals, so much the better. CBut in 
a] conflict of interest between saving individual Jews 
and the good of the Zionist enterprise, we shall say 
the enterprise comes first. (27.) 
Ben-Gurion, as the leader of the Yishuv, held great sway 
over the whole movement and his sentiment became the 
operative philosophy for Zionism throughout the world. 
For many Zionists, the attainment of a Jewish State 
ranked above all other considerations. The Jewish people 
would continue to suffer without a state, although it might 
appear as if they had peace. Even Jews in tolerant nations 
like the United States and Great Britain were not truly 
safe. Some day the latent anti-Semitism which lay under the 
surface of every Gentile culture would come forth. 
Ideological purists believed that since Zionism was to 
address the needs of all Jews -- it needed to be based on 
universal principles. An undue focus on the needs of 
individuals threatened the universality of the movement. A 
strategy which depended on linking the refugees, a specific 
group of people, with the creation of the state conflicted 
with the basic Zionist concept of the state being for all 
Jews. The Zionist organ New Palestine quoted Dr. Silver on 
this subject. 
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I am tired of hearing about refuge and shelter. 
That is not Zionism. I want to hear about redemption --
the redemption of a people from homelessness and 
artificial pain and grief. Refuge for the exiled and 
shelter for the oppressed -- all of that is included in 
the goal which is infinitely greater and more 
resplendent.(28.) 
Although ideological purity was important to some, such 
as Rabbi Silver, of much greater importance to Zionist goals 
was the potential danger of linking the DPs to the argued 
need for the state. Linking the Jewish state to the need for 
a haven for the DPs made Zionism vulnerable. However, this 
linkage enabled the Zionist to make Zionism appear 
humanitarian, thereby winning the support of every American 
who wanted to see good prevail in the world. 
Since the DP/rescue argument was so potent, the 
Zionists made extensive use of it. This "undue focus" on 
rescue in Zionist propaganda worried many even during the 
war. A struggle ensued between those who advocated a 
strategy which employed a greater focus on refugees and 
those who advocated a strategy with a stronger expression of 
fundamental Zionism. At a meeting of the AZEC on May 1, 1944 
the problem was aired. The minutes of that meeting read in 
part: 
Dr. Silver said he had been thinking in the last 
few months about our line of propaganda, and had come 
to the conclusion that while we have done a good job m 
emphasizing the urgency of our claims in view of the 
crying need of so many helpless refugees, and the need 
of opening the doors of Palestine to these 
unfortunates, he was not certain that we had done such 
a good job in spreading the philosophy of Zionism, 
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either to the non-Jews or the Jews. The result is that 
our propaganda is beginning to back fire a bit. Our 
over-emphasis on the matter of the refugees has given 
our opponents an opportunity to say that if that is 
what we are interested in, why not concentrate on 
refugees and forget about politics.(29.) 
Silver, of all the Zionist leaders, with the possible 
exception of Ben-Gurion, was the most committed to pure 
Zionism. He had no patience for compromise, or any tactic 
which might undermine the final goals of Zionism. Others, 
such as Emanuel Neumann, who also served on the AZEC 
Executive, often tried to soften Silver's position. Neumann, 
at the same meeting, stated that the issue was not an 
antithesis between, a stress on refugees or a stress on 
ideology, rather it was question of emphasis. The minutes 
continue: 
The problem lies in the situation itself. The 
whole world is preoccupied with this overwhelming 
tragedy. Mr. Neumann recalled Dr. Weizmann's statement 
at the Biltmore Conference that the weight of the 
Jewish tragedy was going to affect the solution of the 
Jewish problem. 
The number of Jews has been reduced. Proposals 
will now be brought forward that will take the edge off 
the problem of refugees. The question is whether we 
stress the immediate refugee problem or the eternal 
refugee problem. That is something that the non-Jews do 
not yet understand, nor do many Jews. The average non-
Jew thinks we have to do with the refugee problem 
created by Hitler. The anomaly of Jewish life is the 
recurrence of the tragedy, and that has to be 
explained.(30.) 
Silver concluded the discussion: 
We are not doing basic Zionist propaganda. The man who 
talks about refugees is considered all right; the man 
who talks of basic Zionist ideology is termed an 
extremist. There is the danger of the Galuth 
[refugeeism] defeating Eretz Israel, because the 
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urgency of admitting refugees may cause the world to 
accept a transitory solution. Therefore the time has 
come for the pendulum to swing back a little, we should 
see that basic Zionist thinking is done by ourselves 
and others.< 31 . ) 
It is important to note that Dr. Silver recognized the 
importance of the refugees. If the world accepted "a 
transitory solution" then the immediate need of the refugees 
would be taken care of and the opportune moment to bring 
about a Jewish State would be lost. The "Galuth", would have 
defeated "Eretz Israel." 
In reading the discussions over propaganda strategy in 
AZEC and AJAFP minutes, the tension between a focus on 
"rescue" and one on "Zionist ideology" runs from the passage 
above (May 1, 1944) all the way to the argument on how to 
plead the Zionist case before the United Nations. There was 
a consistent concern that "refugeeism" might overwhelm 
"Zionism". However, the tenacity and importance of the 
refugee issue (after the war it became specifically the DP 
issue) insured that propaganda revolved around the needs of 
the refugees. Even as insistent a critic of the "refugee 
emphasis" as Silver, felt compelled to use it in his 
addresses- Abandoning his earlier insistence on a decoupling 
of the refuge and statehood issues, Silver accepted a more 
pragmatic approach in which the DP proDlem would lend itself 
to the creation of Israel. 
Of special importance were the UN addresses. The debate 
over the proper argument before the UN reveals the problem 
in sharp relief. Zionist, strategists had to decide between 
two statements: one clearly spelled out the real reason for 
the state as a potential haven for all Jews, even those in 
the United States and the Soviet Union; the other, while 
still implying as much, de-emphasized the role of the new 
state as a haven for all Jews (i.e. a place which American 
and Russian Jews might consider as their real home) and 
emphasized that the needs of "our unfortunate 
refugees... still languishing in the displaced person's 
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camps" must be met if justice was to be served. 
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A special session of the General Assembly decided on 
May 5, 1947 to recognize the Jewish Agency as the "Jewish 
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representative body for consultation with the UN." The 
Executive Committee of the AJAFP met that night to discuss 
what Silver would say in the address that he would give on 
May 8. As with earlier debates, the concern rested on 
whether it was wise to stress the situation of the DPs. Some 
members pointed out that it wouldn't "sit well for us to 
indicate in any way, for example, that the Jews of the 
United States have a need for a National Home in Palestine 
in the narrow sense of going there. It would be tactless, to 
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say the least, at this point to indicate that." Others 
agreed reluctantly, since Zionism was based on the premise 
that all Jews had need of a National Home. Abraham Tulin, 
another member of the AZEC Executive, spoke of the 
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importance of retaining a strong stress on the needs of the 
DPs . 
...all the emphasis ever since the end of the war and 
ever since the letter to Prime Minister Attlee has 
been on the needs of the displaced persons. Now, every 
member of the Committee fully realized the danger of 
connecting the Zionist case to a DP question. We all 
realize it. We all hate it. We don't want it. On the 
other hand, there is a certain advantage to be gained 
from the emphasis on the desperate need... (35.) 
Silver, as was his wont, was very hesitant to include a 
strong stress on the DP problem. 
What I am concerned about is that we want to 
include all persecuted people, {i.e., all Jews) and... 
that in pointing up the question of the persecution and 
DPCs]...we seem to do exactly what we have not wanted 
to do all along, to make our problem a problem of 
displaced persons and refugees. I am considering 
leaving it out. Our problem is not a refugee problem. 
We don't want to convert it to one.(36.) 
Mr. Robinson, a Lithuanian who had fled to America 
during the war, disagreed strongly. He maintained that the 
strategy of the Arabs was to divorce the DP issue from 
Palestine and that if the Zionists did not stress it they 
would be defeated. Robinson felt that if "we take out the 
pressure of the displaced persons... the Committee [UNSCOP] 
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may not go along." 
The discussion concluded when a member of the AJAFP 
Executive, Professor Handler, stressed that the main 
advantage to the DP argument was that "it puts the American 
government on the spot...and there is terrific political 
advantage to us in putting the American delegation [of 
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UNSCOP] on the spot." 
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The DP issue proved too important to leave out. This 
became obvious in Silver's later address to the UN General 
Assembly on October 2, 1947. Dr. Silver elaborated on the 
needs of "our unfortunate refugees...still languishing in 
48 
the displaced persons' camps." As Professor Handler 
maintained, there was "terrific political advantage... in 
putting the American delegation on the spot." 
This issue of the refugees/DPs had in fact put great 
pressure on the Americans. The emotional appeal of the issue 
was perhaps the most powerful aspect of the Zionist 
argument. Having organized a vast network of grassroots 
organizations both of Jews and of Christians (local 
committees of the AZEC and the American Christian Palestine 
Committee), the AZEC was able to virtually saturate the 
nation with pro-Zionist propaganda. AZEC, at its peak 
controlled over 400 such local committees or ECs (Emergency 
Committees) throughout the United States. Each EC, directly 
responsible to the AZEC, could act immediately on any 
directive from the committee. This gave the AZEC tremendous 
potential to promote its policies nation-wide with very 
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little delay. Rabbi Leon Feuer, who was in charge of 
finding leaders for the local ECs later observed: 
For the next several years these committees were 
to operate with such phenomenal effectiveness as to 
startle even a Washington grown blase about lobbying. 
At a single telephone call they went immediately into 
action. More than one Government official and 
newspaperman expressed his astonishment at the speed 
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and efficiency of the execution.... 
These utterly devoted and tireless bands of local 
Zionists of all parties hounded local editors for 
favorable comment, arranged forums for the Zionist case 
in churches, schools, and civic groups, solicited 
statements from political candidates, sent deputations 
at their own expense to Washington to interview 
Congressmen and Senators, and at critical junctures 
flooded the White House, the State Department and 
Congressional offices with literally thousands upon 
thousands of letters and telegrams. They organized 
local branches of the American Christian Palestine 
Committee, for whom speakers and seminars were 
arranged.(40.) 
The political power of the AZEC network, especially since no 
similar Arab lobby existed, was staggering. 
The AZEC, based much of its political work on high-
pressure tactics as comments from a March 3, 1944 meeting 
will reveal. Goldman pointed out to the Executive Committee 
that "it was not wise to use high pressure methods 
continuously. Such methods would be more effective, he 
believed, if the work is carried on quietly for a time. He, 
too stressed the great importance of educational work in 
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Washington." At the same meeting, however, "Dr. Silver 
pointed out that this statement [a recent pro-Zionist 
statement by President Roosevelt] was obtained as a result 
of great pressure of public opinion, and believed that the 
pressure should be continued in order that the President be 
kept aware that the American people look to him to take 
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concrete action to give evidence of his good will." 
A few months later, on June 5, 1944, the Executive 
Committee of AZEC worried that it was being labeled as a 
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pressure group. A report was made that the War Writers Board 
sent out a memo "pointing out that the American public is 
being confused by the Zionists, who are seeking to identify 
what is a political issue with the purely humanitarian 
refugee problem. Innuendos in the course of the editorial 
suggested further that the Zionists were merely another 
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pressure group." 
High-pressure, however, was consistent with the nature 
of their subject. The whole concept of a nation rising out 
of the carnage of the holocaust was filled with pathos. The 
Zionist argument was perhaps most potent due to the pathos 
of the situation. The refugees desperately needed succour. 
Against their wishes, the American Zionist leadership had to 
constantly appeal to the needs of the Jewish refugees, 
stressing the sentimental characteristics of the problem, in 
order to gain public support. In a meeting of the AZEC on 
August 28, 1945, Dr. Benjamin Akzin, director of AZEC's 
Washington bureau, said, "very often in the past we have 
tried to base our case on sentiment only." He continued to 
to say that the Zionists needed to prepare counter arguments 
to the objection that creating a Jewish homeland was 
contrary to American interests and that "we must have 
arguments to show that despite this policy (of considering 
44 
American interests first) our case should prevail...." 
Akzin admitted that the Zionists needed to base their 
case on issues other than the interests of the United 
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States. Although he seems to want to avoid using "sentiment 
only" there is not much else to base the argument on if 
indeed it is not in the national interest. In a meeting 
later that same year, "Professor Handler expressed himself 
in accord with Judge Rothenberg and Mr. Neuman. Mr. Bevin's 
[British foreign secretary] challenge must be met on the 
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emotional rather than on the rational plane." This 
position is completely understandable. From a purely 
rational position which was concerned with "national 
interests", little could be gained either for Great Britain 
or for the United States, by opening the gates of Palestine 
or by creating a Jewish State. The importance of Arab oil 
was just beginning to become apparent and therefore the 
necessity of cultivating Arab good will. If a Jewish State 
was to be won, it would have to come primarily from the good 
will, (or guilt feelings) of the American or British 
peoples. 
Zionist speakers, in order to "create a moral cry for 
Justice" or perhaps to utilize guilt feelings, often used 
the Holocaust to make their point. During a meeting with 
congressional leaders, on November 19, 1943, "Dr. Silver 
described vividly, even though succinctly, the Jewish 
tragedy in Europe where only a few million will remain after 
Hitler's slaughter of them, and pointed out that if Zionism 
was right during the First World War... it is certainly a 
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thousand times right today, in view of the recent terrible 
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Jewish experience." When the issue of Palestine came 
before the United Nations in May of 1947, David Horowitz, a 
representative from the Yishuv, and the other Jewish 
representatives presented the arguments for the partitioning 
of Palestine, among other points, Horowitz reports: "Six 
million Jews, one third of the entire people, were 
slaughtered in the World War. Supreme human 1ustice requires 
that a_ refuge be given to the survivors. The world must once 
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and for all solve the Jewish problem" (emphasis mine). 
While in theory Zionists agreed that bestowing too much 
attention on rescue could destroy Zionism, in practice, 
Zionist speakers made rescue and the needs of the DPs the 
central issue in their argument for a Jewish State in 
Palestine. This fact is most dramatically illustrated in 
Silver's main address before the United Nations General 
Assembly on October 3, 1947. Silver, one of the most 
dedicated Zionist opponents of using the refugee/DP issue in 
Zionist rhetoric, was lavish with its use in his speech: 
...Our unfortunate refugees are still languishing 
in the displaced persons' camps facing a third winter 
after the termination of the war.... 
The 'intense urge' of the Jewish displaced persons 
to proceed to Palestine and the refusal of most of them 
to go anywhere else springs not only from their 
realization that the prospects of their admission to 
other countries is slight in the extreme, and even then 
only of a very limited scope. It springs pre-eminently 
from the fact that Palestine offers to them that which 
they need most and cannot find anywhere else; (sic) the 
chance of a real home, the prospect of a life in 
congenial surroundings, the insurance of permanency. 
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All the longing of these uprooted people for a 
life of peace and dignity, for a normal and secure 
existence finds expression in this intense urge to go 
to Palestine. What more overwhelming and tragic 
evidence of this urge is required than the persistent 
and desperate attempts of these men, women and children 
to reach the shores of the Jewish National Home from 
where they are forcibly turned back--in the case of the 
Exodus 1947, back to Germany!(48) 
It is obvious from this statement that the DP issue was 
vital for the Zionist argument for statehood. Surely this is 
demonstrated when Silver, originally so adamantly against 
the inclusion of the "rescue issue" lest it destroy Zionism, 
used such strong "rescue" terminology in his address. 
As we see in Silver's address, one of the most 
sensational aspects of the DP issue was illegal immigration. 
As one member of the Executive Committee, Mr. Furmansky, 
said in a meeting on November 14, 1946: "Our most potent 
political argument today is illegal immigration and that the 
Jews are ready to risk being killed in going to 
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Palestine." Ada Serini, a Mossad/Aliyah Beth operative 
who was responsible for organizing many of the Haganah ships 
leaving from Italy said in an interview on August 23, 1987 
that Aliyah Beth had two tasks: to bring people to Palestine 
51 . 
and give them hope; and to bring about political change. 
Probably the most important aspect of the illegal 
immigration was its political effect. As Silver had said in 
his address, "what more tragic and overwhelming evidence" 
was needed to reveal the desire of the DPs for Palestine 
then that they were willing to risk their lives to get to 
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Palestine. It should be borne in mind however that those who 
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boarded the ships were chosen by the Mossad. The 
passengers of the Haganah Ships were a select group, chosen 
because of their zeal for the Zionist cause. Without 
question the most important single event that helped the 
Zionist cause was the Exodus affair, to which Silver 
alluded. 
The Zionists needed a bold countermeasure to defeat 
Bevin's hard new policy of "refoulment." Refoulment required 
that all Haganah ships be escorted back to their port of 
origin. Cohen writes, "The Zionists proved equal to the 
challenge, planning the whole operation (the Exodus) for 
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maximum political effect." The Exodus was to arrive in 
Palestine during the visit of UNSCOP. Haganah organizers 
would insure that the incident would produce the maximum 
amount of publicity. The British played into the hands of 
the Zionist propaganda efforts by deciding to make an 
example of the ship. They hoped that a harsh treatment of 
the Exodus would discourage any future illegal immigration 
attempts if, instead of ending in Palestine or at least in 
the detention camps in Cyprus, the ships were forced back to 
their port of origin. When the Exodus came within thirty 
kilometers of Palestine, British marines, from the four 
destroyers which had been following, boarded her. This 
started a hand to hand battle which was relayed to the whole 
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world via Haganah radio transmitters. 
Close to dawn, the British commander. Captain Watson, 
prepared to notify the army that he had failed and that on­
shore units be ready to arrest any who made it to the shore. 
Before he could relay his message, however, the Jewish 
leaders on board the ship decided to stop fighting. Ike 
Aranne, the Palmach captain of the ship, had wanted to 
continue fighting believing that the fight could be won ana 
that he could then land the passengers. However, Yosi Har-
el, senior representative both of the Hagana and the Mossad, 
on the ship, thought that the main goal was not landing the 
passengers, but rather creating a major public demonstration 
to "show how poor and weak and helpless we were and how 
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cruel the British were." 
As Cohen writes, "the object Cof the Exodus 3 was to 
show the refugees to the world, through the medium of 
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UNSCOP, in the most pitiable state possible." Though the 
Captain could have beached the ship and thus delivered the 
immigrants (the publicized goal of the mission), political 
expediency outweighed the immediate needs of the 4,500 
Jewish DPs. The political value of the ship became enormous 
after it docked temporarily at Haifa. Emil Sandstrom, the 
Swedish chairman of UNSCOP, Valado Simic, the Yugoslav 
delegate, and Aubrey (Abba) Eban of the Jewish Agency 
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watched the ship's arrival; so did the press. 
Film clips of the event were shown in movie houses 
6 S 
across the world and newspapers showed pictures of the 
hapless survivors of the concentration camps, being bullied 
by English soldiers. Hardly a more potent image was 
possible. A world so recently delivered from the Nazis 
recoiled from an image so reminiscent of them. The situation 
became much worse when France would not take the passengers 
back into Port-de-Bouc from which the Exodus had sailed, 
(the principle of "defoulment"), and the British decided to 
bring the ship and its passengers to Hamburg. The saga 
gained a thoroughly inhuman flavor: 4,500 "Holocaust 
survivors" forced to stay on a grossly overcrowded and 
unsanitary ship for a return trip to the country in whose 
name they had been persecuted. Previous support for the 
British position plummeted. 
The Exodus affair had crucial importance in 
contributing to the pathos of the situation; most Americans 
got their first dose of the problem of the DPs through 
exposure to it. At a meeting of the Executive Committee of 
AJAFP one member said "I would say that since you all left, 
the State Department is concerned about the Exodus, which 
was of definite importance both directly and indirectly. For 
those people who did not know very much about the Palestine 
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problem, the Exodus was of significant importance." 
The needs of the DPs served as the most important facet 
of Zionist propaganda. By stressing the needs of the DPs 
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Zionist propagandists were able to "create a moral cry for 
Justice" and "cultivate a receptive American public." Their 
efforts were effective enough to prompt the American people, 
both Jews and non-Jews, to lobby their government to create 
a Jewish State. Zionists held the specter of the Holocaust 
in front of the eyes of the American people and accentuated 
the "universal guilt of Christendom." Having done so, they 
connected the issue of the DPs to the Holocaust and demanded 
that since "Six million Jews...were slaughtered in the World 
War, supreme human justice require(d) that a refuge be 
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given to the survivors." Zionist propaganda led Americans 
to believe that the DPs in fact wanted no other country but 
Palestine. The propaganda also showed a people willing to 
"risk their lives to get to Palestine." The Aliyah Beth 
ships, and particularly the Exodus showed the world a 
pitiful people who were willing to die for Palestine. 
Zionist literature also made a strong case that no other 
country would receive these unfortunates. Therefore, the 
logical solution was to vote for the partition of Palestine. 
Conclusion 
The survivors of the Holocaust were of utmost 
importance to the creation of the Jewish State. They served 
not only to prick the conscience of the world but also to 
verify the Zionist argument. If they were accommodated too 
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quickly, if indeed another haven was found for them, the 
Zionist argument for the need of a Jewish state would be in 
jeopardy. Even though the refugees were one of the most 
important components of the Zionist strategy, the Zionists 
had to be careful not to stress them too much or the non-
Zionists and anti-Zionists could legitimately ask, "If you 
are concerned about these people, then help us find a 
suitable home for them where they can go now." The 
possibility that non-Zionists would question their motives 
was a very real danger to the Zionists, as was the danger 
that an alternative haven would be found. 
The Zionists faced a dilemma. First they had to be 
careful to not overstress the refugee problem, lest they 
inadvertently contribute to a temporary solution. But 
clearly an humanitarian appeal for succour for the DPs was 
the most obvious, indeed the only truly effective way to 
gain world support. The Zionists found themselves forced by 
circumstances to appeal continually to the need of the 
survivors of the Holocaust. Those who had died could no 
longer be helped and Zionist theory by itself was difficult 
for most non-Jews and even a large number of Jews to believe 
especially in America. Conventional wisdom agreed that 
terrible persecution had occurred in Nazi Germany, but 
attributed it the work of an evil madman and his machinery. 
It would never happen in the United States. The American 
public would never understand pure Zionist ideology enough 
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•to promote legislation which was, in many ways, contrary to 
American interests. Like it or not, the Zionist propaganda 
had to elicit a cry for justice. Like it or not, Zionist 
propaganda had to revolve around the refugees, and after the 
war, the DPs. Zionist leaders had to arouse the American 
public to moral action and still show that no other rescue 
scheme would work. They had to prove that the only option 
for these people was Palestine. To do this, the Zionists had 
to show that the DPs wanted to go only to Palestine and that 
no other nation would take them anyway. Proving these two 
points consumed much of their efforts. The next two chapters 
will consider what they did and had done to insure that the 
public would believe that the DPs did in fact want to go to 
Palestine and that no other nation would take them. 
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Chapter 3: The Displaced Person Camps 
Starting with the Harrison report in August 1945 and 
continuing with the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry in 
April 1946 and the UNSCOP (United Nations Special Committee 
on Palestine) report in Autumn of 1947, it became commonly 
accepted in the United States and eventually in the rest of 
the world, that the Jewish DPs were virtually unanimous in 
their desire to go to Palestine. It is the contention of 
this chapter that in fact only one half actually wanted to 
go to Palestine, while the others primarily wanted to go to 
the United States or the Commonwealth countries. Before I 
outline the reasons for this discrepancy, it would be 
instructive to review the situation. 
The Allies faced a new problem in June of 1945. What 
should be done with the survivors of the concentration 
camps? Thousands of people, suddenly freed from the fear of 
death, had no desire to return to the land of their 
tormentors. For them the land contained only memories of 
their tortured loved ones. The great majority wanted to 
leave Europe to start a new life far from the memory of 
their terror. The nations of the world, however, fearful of 
exacerbating domestic tension and still xenophobic from the 
war-time threat of foreign spies, did not wish to suffer any 
new public liabilities and did not extend offers of 
citizenship to the newly displaced persons. Since the non-
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European nations did not seem to want them and since the DPs 
did not wish to be repatriated, the Allied nations had to 
provide for their basic needs. UNRRA, (The United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; working under the 
authority the Allied armies, set up camps and provided food 
and other essentials for survival. UNRRA also facilitated a 
number of volunteer relief organizations to help in the 
1 
process of rehabilitation. These organizations (see chart) 
provided some basic amenities and additional food supplies. 
They also initiated cultural and educational projects. A 
number of different governmental agencies also had various 
2 
roles in the camps. Obviously life in the camps was far 
less than satisfactory both for the inmates and for those 
who must pay the bills; permanent political solutions had to 
be found. 
The Jewish DPs were a vital part in the process to 
create a Jewish state. The DPs would serve to enlist 
American help in the struggle against British intransigence 
by pricking the conscience of the American citizens. 
Secondly, the Yishuv needed many more immigrants in order to 
secure a majority of the voters in their proposed future 
democracy. More immigrants were also needed to improve the 
economic fortunes of the community, and to build its 
defensive capabilities. Lastly, the presence of the DPs was 
important for propaganda reasons. As Roosevelt said of 
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Jewish refugees during the war, "(the Zionists) know that 
they can raise vast sums of money for Palestine by saying to 
3 
donors, 'There is no other place this poor Jew can go.'" 
The Zionist leaders knew that the DP issue was of 
fundamental importance. They needed to influence the 
decisions of political leaders about the future of these 
people; they also had to convince as many as possible of the 
DPs to come to Palestine. Here they could pursue the two 
goals in tandem. If Zionist leaders could make the point 
that there were 250,000 survivors of Hitler left homeless 
and unwanted in squalid DP camps, the vast majority of whom 
wanted to go to Palestine, perhaps humanitarian leaders 
would assuage their consciences by hastening the creation of 
a Jewish state or at least advocating increased Jewish 
immigration to Palestine. 
The Harrison, AACI, and UNSCOP reports were in error 
with regard to the desired destination for the DPs. First, 
the organization of the camps was overwhelmingly Zionist in 
orientation. The Zionist political dominance was, in large 
part, attributable to the presence of large numbers of 
Zionist workers. At the outset these Zionist workers were 
largely independent from the central authority of the Jewish 
Agency, but this changed rapidly. By November 1945 the 
"shlihim" (official representatives from the Yishuv) had 
4 
wielded political authority in various camp committees. In 
addition to controlling the pattern of camp life, including 
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education and cultural events, all of which could be heavily 
weighted to "prepare the people for Palestine", the camp 
committee members acted as spokesmen for the camps. 
Naturally they would convey an image favorable to Zionist 
aims. In reporting where the DPs wished to go they would 
have naturally responded, "Palestine". 
Most of the DPs wanted to see a Jewish State come 
into existence even if they did not want to go there 
themselves. It is conceivable, for instance, that a non-
Zionist who actually wanted to emigrate to the United States 
would state in a questionnaire that he wanted to go to 
Palestine, in hopes that so answering he would help his 
fellow DPs attain their goals without endangering his own. 
Michael Cohen writes, "Most of those DPs who did not 
initially wish to go to Palestine were persuaded quite 
easily that for the sake of the majority they should present 
a united Jewish front to the committee [the Anglo-American 
5 
Committee of Inquiry]." 
Most DPs simply wanted to leave Europe. The final 
destination mattered less then the leaving. Most who wanted 
to go to the United States would also have been content to 
go to Palestine if that option opened up. Zionist workers 
told the DPs that their best chance of leaving Europe was by 
presenting a unified front seeking to go to Palestine. It 
was in the DPs best interest to secure at least one place of 
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refuge. Anything was better than another year in a Displaced 
Person camp. 
Most of those conducting the emigration polls had 
Zionist leanings and so would naturally want to deliver 
results that showed a strong majority of DPs choosing 
Palestine. Since there were few ant1-Zionists in the 
American zone, few felt it necessary to challenge the poll 
6 
results. Because of the lack of independent verification, 
the poll results should be read with great care. 
The changing population of the camps created another 
difficulty in determining the wishes of the DPs. The camp 
population was comprised of three basic groups, each 
arriving at different times, having different points of 
origin and thus different points of view toward Zionism. The 
survivors of the concentration camps accounted for roughly 
30,000 of the final 250,000 Jewish DPs. The first to settle 
the camps, they often simply stayed at the same camps where 
they had been interned earlier. The "forest" Jews, the next 
group to come, began to stream into the camps in the winter 
of 1945-46. They had "contrived to escape the ghettos by 
hiding in the forests or on the 'Aryan' side of the ghetto 
7 
walls," mostly in Poland. The final group, comprised 
largely of families, had been evacuated by the Russians in 
1941 and repatriated to Poland after the war. Finding 
their possessions in others' hands and life difficult, if 
not impossible in Poland, they came in a flood to the 
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American zone of Germany, especially in the later half of 
1946. Eventually approximately 150,000 Polish Jews arrived 
in this mass exodus. 
Each of these groups had different intentions. Those 
with families naturally wanted to go some place where their 
children could live in peace, safety, and security. The 
younger DPs tended to be more interested in creating a 
Jewish state. The population of the camps was also always m 
flux as people came and went in constant search for their 
loved ones. A sense of confusion pervaded the camps and 
foiled attempts by the authorities to plan for and 
understand the DPs; therefore, the authorities often relied 
on the representatives of the DPs who were, as we have seen, 
Zionist. How did a predominately Zionist leadership emerge 
in the camps? 
Victor E. Frankl, in his classic work Man'a Pursuit of 
Meaning, said that those who were most prone to survive the 
holocaust were those who had something to live for, a goal, 
or a purpose; an all-consuming vision that continued to 
8 
propel them onwards. Two main groups fit this description: 
the Zionists and the orthodox Jews. Leonard Dinnerstein, in 
America and the Survivors of the Holocaust, writes: "The 
orthodox, who trusted in God, along with the nonreligious 
but otherwise equally zealous Zionists, recovered most 
quickly from the war's deprivations. The moderately or 
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indifferently religious survivors suffered the most." The 
Zionist's burning devotion to the principle of a Jewish 
state and the orthodox Jew's devotion to a living God and 
an ancient tradition gave each the will to continue living 
when others had given up. But while the orthodox Jew 
returned to the confines of an orthodox faith after 
liberation, the Zionist zealously pursued Zionist goals. 
Far from diminishing Zionism, the holocaust stoked its 
fires. Not only had the holocaust proven the validity of the 
Zionist vision, but it had tempered the Zionist activists 
who survived it. As Frankl had focused on the love of his 
wife as a method to help him survive, the ardent Zionist 
imagined the founding of a Jewish State. This entrenched the 
hope and made it a burning need and drive. No longer was it 
simply an ideology. The dream, having preserved life, became 
the focus of life. It was in this context that Judah Nadich 
in The Redeemers reports: 
When a unit of the Brigade appeared at the Flakkaserne 
the morning of June 20, the trim bronzed men in khaki, 
waving emblems with blue-and-white Stars of David, were 
quickly surrounded and all but overwhelmed. 
"It's only a dream," a young woman exclaimed 
tearfully. 
"Thank God," another whispered fervently, "for 
letting us live to see this day."(10.) 
For a people who had endured utter humiliation, the sight of 
the Star of David displayed in pride and in power served as 
a panacea to the soul. It would be hard to overemphasize the 
importance of the transformation of this symbol. From a 
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badge of shame, humiliation and imminent death, the Star of 
David became symbol of of ultimate victory, pride and self-
sufficiency . 
The Zionist vision provided a basis for Jewish self-
esteem. The period of the liberation naturally saw the 
emergence of Zionist leadership. Not only had its warnings 
proven true (thus discrediting the anti-Zionist position) 
but it seemed to have the only viable political plan. The 
holocaust effectively eliminated all other opposition. As 
the Jewish Advisor to the Zonal Commander, Judge Simon 
Rifkmd, later summed up in his final report to the War 
Department: 
Many of the Jews who are today living in Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Roumania are baffled and 
perplexed, insecure in the present, fearful of the 
future. Not so the Jews in Germany and Austria. They 
know what they want: they want to quit Europe; they 
want to live together, not dispersed among a population 
that regards them as alien; they desire to live in the 
pattern of their own historic culture; they visualize 
the realizations of their desires in Palestine. Because 
they have a policy and a program, they have emerged as 
the vanguard of east European Jewry.(11.) 
Rifkind implied that all "the Jews in Germany and 
Austria... visualize the realizations of their desires in 
Palestine." To imply that all the Jews of Germany and 
Austria wanted Palestine is suspect but by making the 
connection between the active pursuit of a vision and the 
development of leadership, he concisely describes the growth 
of Zionist political leadership in the camps. Those who had 
"a policy and a program" became the vanguard, not only for 
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the European Jew but for all Jewry. For this reason it is 
12 
clear why Zionists emerged as leaders in the camps. 
Zionists were completely committed to the creation of a 
Jewish state. Only a Jewish State would finally solve the 
millenia old Jewish problem. Herbert Agar writes how the 
days of passive acceptance of persecution were over; new 
ways had to be tried. 
Europe had taught the Jews that saintliness and 
scholarship were not enough. Gentleness and charity led 
to torture and gas and burning. Toughness was what the 
goyim respected. So the Saving Remnant faced the truth: 
they could sit quietly rotting in the camps, since 
nobody wanted them; or they could fight their way out, 
against all odds, with an implacable will and an 
indifference to rules, laws, orders, and all the 
apparatus of power.(13.) 
In the first few days after liberation, emerging 
Zionist leaders began to organize the camps and established 
14 
"working committees for Zionist purposes." They then 
called for a convention of the "Federation of the Sheerith 
Hapletah" (the Saving Remnant) to be held on July 1, 1945 at 
Feldafing. At this convention, 41 delegates from most of the 
DP camps in Bavaria came and created the Central Committee 
15 
of Liberated Jews (hereafter CCLJ). There they put forth 
an appeal "for the immediate restoration of the land of 
Israel as a Jewish State." Later the Committee members told 
a group of representatives of major American Jewish civic 
organizations: "Our main task is to strive for the opening 
of the gates to Palestine and we hope that you who represent 
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all the factions of American Jewry will unite with us in 
16 
this struggle." 
This phenomenon should not be seen as a spontaneous 
response of all the DPs to seek a Jewish State. The 
historian also needs to beware of attributing the fast and 
pervasive growth of Zionist political control merely to the 
impact of the holocaust in advancing Zionist principles and 
molding Zionist leaders. Much of the credit for this 
political miracle should be laid at the feet of Zionist 
workers who were not DPs. Shlihim, representatives of the 
organized Jewish community in Palestine, were at work in 
Europe specifically to help organize the camps for future 
emigration to Palestine. By early October 1945 there were 12 
such shlihim operating in Germany. Some of them had come as 
members of the Jewish Brigade and others directly from 
17 
Palestine. Sympathetic Army chaplains also helped. Rabbi 
Abraham Klausner, a young American chaplain, had a major 
18 
role in forming and organizing the CCLJ. 
Chaplain Judah Nadich who served as the "Advisor on 
Jewish Affairs to General Eisenhower" played a major role in 
bringing together the many different and at times confusing 
aspects of the Jewish organizations in the camps. His 
assistance in Zionist-related issues was also substantial. 
He reported that after attending a Central Zionist Committee 
meeting in early October, 1945, 
I was asked to convey to Moshe Shertok Ca member of the 
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Jewish Agency's Executive Committee and later, Israeli 
Prime Minister] a message from the Central Zionist 
Committee. They asked me to inform him that there was 
great need of more effectively organized Zionist 
activity in Germany with a central Zionist office and 
with subsidiary offices in various parts of the 
country.(19.) 
Since Nadich was in frequent "telephonic" communication with 
virtually all the important Zionist leaders in Europe "vital 
information and important instructions could be communicated 
back and forth through my office, frequently speeding up 
20 
urgent action." 
The CCLJ continued to forge closer ties with the Jewish 
Agency. Leo Schwarz, in The Redeemers, wrote: "There were 
secret obligations of the Committee to the Zionist 
underground which often conflicted with official 
21 
regulation." In fact once there had been sufficient 
organization, the authority of the shlihim was exercised 
everywhere. Bauer writes, "On the borders and vital DP camps 
Palestinian shlihim consequently took over." By Nov. 1945 
"all the camp committees [in Austria] had to be subservient 
to commanders nominated by the Brichah. ...and while there 
were to be occasional camp committee elections, these were 
22 
to be always subject to Brichah control." 
Bauer denies that this degree of control was exercised 
in the camps outside of Austria however. "It must be borne 
in mind that this was by no means accepted Brichah 
procedure: in Germany, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, local 
communities or DP camps were self-governing, and Brichah 
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never dreamed of turning them into instruments for its own 
23 
purposes." It is certain, however, that the Brichah had 
considerable control in at least the most important camps. 
Herbert Agar writes: "The Central Committee (the CCLJ).... 
was deep in plots with the Brichah--the escape group, manned 
24 
chiefly by members of the Mossad le Aliyah Beth." Mossad 
had established certain camps as transit centers for the 
movement of select Jews from Eastern Europe to military 
training camps, or illegal immigration departure points in 
Italy. Landsberg, one of the largest and most important of 
the camps in the American zone, (it held 5,000 inmates), 
"had been designated as a reception center for unauthorized 
groups, mainly Zionist youth collectives, arriving from 
25 
Poland." This was just one of many such stations in an 
elaborately conceived operation to bring people from the 
eastern European countries to stations as close to Palestine 
as possible. Frank Gervasi links Ben-Gurion and this 
operation, "the moment [Ben-Gurion] realized that Bevin [the 
British foreign secretary] had no intention of keeping 
Labor's pro-Zionist campaign promises, Ben-Gurion ordered 
into operation a long-readied escape route leading from the 
26 
DP camps to Palestine." Gervasi indicates that the escape 
route had 24 clandestine stations and that Haganah agents 
oversaw its operation. 
The Haganah agents also assisted in covert defensive 
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preparations. Bernard Postal discusses the military training 
operations: 
Eleven camps for escaped DPs from Germany and Austria 
maintained by the Haganah around Marseilles, Milan, and 
Ban ...[were] ostensibly refugee centers Lbut] were 
actually advance training bases of Gahal (Guitz Hutz-
L'Eretz) for Haganah recruits from the DP camps.... 
Palmach missions in all the DP camps and at the Cyprus 
detention centers directed premilitary and paramilitary 
courses.(27.) 
This recruiting effort was supported by other organizations 
as well. "Relief teams from Palestine attached to UNRRA 
units, Jewish military personnel from Palestine demobilized 
in Italy, and American Jewish chaplains with the occupation 
forces encouraged Zionist sentiment and promoted enlistment 
2 8  
in the Haganah." For the most part these activities went 
unnoticed by the military authorities. However, they did 
discover some of these operations and closed them down. A 
UNRRA report says: 
A cleverly concealed band of Jewish propagandists, 
forming what is believed to be an important staging 
post on the Jewish underground route to Palestine has 
been discovered here [Hamburg]. It was acting under the 
cover of a so-called fisheries school supported by 
UNRRA.(29 . ) 
The shlihim and those who worked under their command, 
exercised great authority over the DPs and were capable of 
controlling the DP camps, the committees and the elections 
of those committees. Since the CCLJ controlled the political 
situation in the camps, it also controlled what image the 
world received about the DPs. UNRRA regarded the camp 
Committees to be representative of the camps and therefore 
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assumed that the committees would represent the wishes of 
the DPs. This of course was a huge assumption. The CCLJ 
would naturally have reported that the DPs wanted to go to 
Palestine since their self-proclaimed purpose was "to strive 
30 
for the opening of the gates of Palestine." The task of 
the historian here is to try to reconstruct the wishes of 
the individuals whose views differed from the hierarchy. 
Where did these DPs want to go? This question is significant 
since it ultimately set the tone for the political debate 
about what to do with the DPs and therefore what to do about 
Palestine. The two issues became inseparably bound together 
in the Harrison report. 
The Harrison report had "an enduring impact on Truman's 
Palestine policy" and would prove to "define the issue for 
31 
three years to come." Grose writes: "For the first time 
and against all the arguments of Britain and the State 
Department, Truman was forced to view the condition of 
Europe's surviving Jews and the political future of 
32 
Palestine as aspects of the same problem." After receiving 
this ostensibly impartial report, Truman felt confident 
that immigration to Palestine was the most practical 
solution for the DP problem. This confidence led him to 
support Zionist aims. However, is the Harrison report 
accurate when it declares that "Palestine is definitely and 
preeminently the first choice" of the DPs? 
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Chaim Weizmann, the President of the World Zionist 
Organization, and his American associate, Meyer W. Weisgal, 
had originally perceived that a carefully constructed 
mission to study the needs of the DPs would benefit the 
33 
Zionist movement. Weisgal asked Treasury Secretary 
Morgenthau to approach Truman with the idea. But Truman, 
distrustful of Morgenthau and harried by the war in the 
Pacific, ignored it. When the State Department (responding 
to a suggestion from Morgenthau) proposed the same plan, 
34 
Truman agreed. "Passing over a candidate proposed by 
Morgenthau's Zionist contacts, the State Department 
nominated Earl G. Harrison, dean of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, Commissioner of Immigration and 
Naturalization during World War II, and director of the 
35 
wartime census of enemy aliens." Known to be an 
administrator without any preconceptions about the DPs or 
Palestine, Harrison was an excellent choice. Grose writes: 
To Weizmann and...Weisgal, this objective but 
idealistic law professor could become an instrument for 
combining the political aspirations of Zionism with the 
plight of the surviving Jews of Europe.(36) 
Harrison was then briefed by Morgenthau's associates 
on the War Refugee Board and paired up with an associate who 
was, as Weisgal had suggested to Morgenthau, "thoroughly 
37 
steeped in the Jewish situation." Weisgal suggested that 
Joseph J. Schwartz, European director of the Joint 
Distribution Committee, accompany Harrison. Schwartz was a 
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strategic choice since, a man from the "Joint," an 
organization which earlier had a reputation of being non or 
even anti-Zionist, would not be "suspected of imposing 
38 
improper Zionist pressure on a fact-finding mission." And 
yet Weisgal wrote to Weizmann that "although Dr. Schwartz is 
on the staff of the JDC, we have absolute faith in his 
39 
integrity and Zionist convictions." At the last minute 
40 
another JDC man, Herbert Katzki, joined the team. In 
Europe, Harrison met with one more person who would 
influence him greatly to see things in a Zionist light. 
Rabbi Abraham Klausner, who had been instrumental in 
organizing the CCLJ in Feldafing, met Harrison and took him 
41 
on a tour of the survivors in Europe. The result of this 
tour, and his exposure to both Klausner and Schwartz, 
convinced Harrison to endorse the Zionist position with 
regard to the DPs and Palestine: 
Palestine is definitely and preeminently the first 
choice. Many now have relatives there, while others, 
having experienced intolerance and persecution in their 
homelands for years, feel that only in Palestine will 
they be welcomed and find peace and quiet and be given 
an opportunity to live and work. In the case of the 
Polish and Baltic Jews the desire to go to Palestine is 
based in a great majority of cases on a love for the 
country and devotion to the Zionist ideal. It is also 
true, however, that there are many who wish to go to 
Palestine because they realize that their opportunity 
to be admitted into the United States or into other 
countries in the Western hemisphere is limited if not 
impossible.... In conclusion, I wish to repeat that the 
main solution, in many ways the only solution, of the 
problem lies in the quick evacuation of all 
nonrepatriable Jews in Germany and Austria, who wish 
it, to Palestine.(42.) 
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Not only did Harrison endorse the Zionist principles, 
he also used Zionist figures. His call for immediate 
granting of 100,000 immigration certificates (at a time when 
there were only 25,000 Jewish DPs in Germany) reflects a 
figure first mentioned in 1938 by the United Palestine 
43 44 
Appeal and in 1944 by Weizmann to Churchill. After 
Harrison's "objective" report, Truman's policy centered 
around trying to get the 100,000 immigration certificates. 
Even the Anglo-American Commission of Inquiry recommended 
the same figure. Zionist appeals thereafter also frequently 
cited the Harrison report as conclusive proof for the 
validity of their claims. A sizable amount of subsequent 
45 
secondary literature tends to assume its accuracy. But, 
although the report's validity was, and still is widely 
accepted, a great deal of evidence suggests that its 
findings are inaccurate. Harrison's report itself is deeply 
suspect not only because of Zionist manipulation of the 
commission but also because of its failure to recognize 
dissenting voices among the DPs. Central among these 
dissenting groups were the the anti-Zionist Socialist Bund 
46 
which called for a return to Poland, and anti-Zionist 
dissenters at Bergen-Belsen. Although these groups were 
relatively small, their exclusion from Harrison's report is 
47 
telling. Harrison also did not consider that "the politics 
of the survivors often depended on their origins. In the 
camps of the American occupation zone, for example. 
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survivors of the Lithuanian ghettos had seized control, and 
48 
they had been strongly Zionist before the war." Finally, 
Grose recounts how a senior American relief worker, who was 
a dedicated Zionist, admitted in a confidential note to 
White House aide David Niles "that Harrison could not 
possibly have substantiated his belief that Palestine was 
the sincere choice of all the Sheenth Hapletah, [the saving 
49 
remnant]." 
Many sources, however, do concur with the Harrison 
report. After his visit to the camps in Autumn of 1945, Ben-
Gurion, with apparent surprise, wrote in his diary, "70 
percent of the survivors do in fact want to go to 
50 
Palestine." Several months after Ben-Gurion's visit to 
the camps, David Niles' informant concluded: "To the extent 
that... personalities are intact and decisions can be made, 
51 
these Jews want to go to Palestine." The "Report to the 
Executive of the Jewish Agency, 1951" was more exuberant: 
"referenda conducted in the DP camps proved that they all 
52 
(emphasis mine) desired to come to this country." Polls 
administered by UNRRA in preparation for the coming of the 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (AACI) showed only a 
slightly smaller percentage than the "Report to the 
Executive's" 100 percent. The polls claimed that 96.8 
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percent of the DPs wanted to go to Palestine. It is no 
wonder then that the Committee of Inquiry, after only three 
91 
weeks of touring, during which one of the two teams had been 
held up for ten days due to illness, would come up with 
results and recommendations similar to the Harrison 
54 
report. 
Apparently then, virtually everyone wanted to go to 
Palestine. However, on a closer look at the evidence, a 
different story emerges. The DP population expressed a wide 
variety of preferences about their final destination. The 
UNRRA field worker at Lubeck wrote: "Out of 446 Jews in the 
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Lubeck camp, 247 want to go to Palestine," or that almost 
half did not. A leader of the orthodox American Vaad 
Hatzalah sent this report to UNRRA: 
From my personal experience and close relation with 
our people, and especially with the 40,000 Jewish DPs 
that the Vaad is caring for and servicing... the people 
have at all times expressed their determination to 
emigrate to two countries, to return to the Land of the 
Prophets, the Holy Soil of Israel and to the United 
States of America. It is our hope that the Congress of 
the United States will pass the pending resolution 
opening the gates of America as a haven for the 
persecutees.(56.) 
The United States and the Commonwealth countries 
emerged as desired destination in most the reports from the 
camps. A report from the British Zone in Germany said of 
their camps: "There is a general feeling of bitter, if not 
cynical disappointment concerning the report that those 
living in the American Zone will receive preference (if not 
monopolistic treatment) in the granting of visas for the 
57 
U.S.A (emphasis mine)." A reporter for New Palestine, an 
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American Zionist newspaper, sent this report about 
conditions in two DP camps: "Salzburg: I found everywhere 
the main preoccupation of the Jewish refugees to be 
emigration, to Palestine, England, and the United States; 
Dachau: The office has taken a census of migration goals. 
The four outstanding ones are Palestine, the British 
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Dominions and Colonies, The United States, and England." 
Drew Middleton of the New York Times wrote in August 1945: 
"According to Mr. Trobe [Jacob L. Trobe was an official with 
JDC], the common objective of almost all the Jews, German 
and otherwise, is to leave Germany and Europe. Mr. Trobe's 
views are verified by most of the German Jews with whom this 
correspondent has talked. Most of whom wish to go to the 
United States, Palestine, and the United Kingdom in that 
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order." These samples are representative of a number of 
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other documents. Based on eye-witness reports of the DP 
camps, it is safe to say that a substantial percentage of 
DPs wished to emigrate to countries other than Palestine. 
Even so, Palestine emerges as one of the first choices, if 
not the first choice of emigration for the DPs. But the 
documentation does not support the contention that an 
obvious majority wanted to go to Palestine. Any broad 
reading of the documentation would demonstrate that the 
figure of 96.8 percent, quoted in the polls taken for the 
Committee of Inquiry, was a gross exaggeration. How can one 
account for this discrepancy? 
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Zionist: arguments for the creation of a Jewish State 
required that the public believe the vast majority of the 
DPs wanted to depart for Palestine. The Zionists needed to 
insure that such a report came from the camps. Because the 
CCLJ represented the DPs, UNRRA authorities had the local 
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camp Committees administer the polls. Since Zionist 
authorities administered the polls, it is easy to see how 
the polls could have been manipulated. One example will 
serve at least to raise doubts. In June of 1947 Miss 
Robertson, the director of the Jewish DP camp at Leipheim 
Airport filed the"results of the poll at her camp, after 
expressing her incredulity: 
"2052 persons in Leipheim filled out the poll papers. 
Q. Do you want to remain in Germany? 
yes -0- no -2052-
Q. If not; do you wish to settle in another European 
Country? 
yes -0- no -2052-
Q. If not, to what country do you like to emigrate? 
Give a first and a second choice. 
First choice -2052 to Palestine 
Second choice -(All those who put down a 
second choice also put down Palestine as their second 
choice.(62.) 
Not all the poll results were equally unanimous but this 
report demonstrates the probability of poll tampering. 
The CCLJ could put considerable pressure on the 
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inmates. Not only did they oversee the political, social, 
and cultural (including education) aspects of the camp, but 
they also had considerable links to the distribution of 
favors. Access to some emigration options and to the 
amenities of the American Joint Distribution Committee 
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(JDC) were often gained through the auspices of the local 
camp committees. The local committees could then exert some 
control by threatening to withhold these advantages. Beverly 
Diamon, a consultant of DP affairs at Feldafing reported on 
July 16, 1945, that "serious rifts" arose in the DP camps 
between those who had applied to go to the United States and 
some of the Zionists. She writes: 
In some camps the situation has become so acute that 
signs have been written on the walls that anyone going 
to America is a traitor, and children have been 
ostracized if they are not members of a Kibuz 
(sic). [The Kibbutzim were oriented around preparation 
for life in Palestine](64.) 
Ms. Diamon continued that one Zionist group, calling 
themselves the 'Partisans', assaulted some of the non-
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Zionists. 
After the UN partition vote on November 29, 1947, even 
more obvious examples became apparent. "A recruitment poster 
[was] displayed in DP camps throughout Germany urging 
enlistment in the Israeli fight for liberation. In Yiddish, 
the poster says in part: 'Men and women between the ages of 
17 to 35 should report for duty to the Jewish people. All 
those of age to be mobilized who do not fulfill their duty 
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will be excluded from the social and political life of the 
community and prohibited from holding any official office in 
66 
the DP community.'" 
Chaplain Klausner, who had worked with the DPs since 
their liberation in May 1945, submitted this controversial 
report to the American Jewish Conference on May 2, 1948: 
The Jews as a group are not overwhelmingly 
desirous of going to Palestine... we may predict that 
perhaps 30% of the people will go to Palestine.... I am 
convinced that the people must be forced to go to 
Palestine. They are not prepared to understand their 
own position nor the promises of the future. To them 
the American dollar looms as the greatest of 
objectives. By 'force' I suggest a program. It is not a 
new program. It was used before, and most recently. It 
was used in the evacuation of the Jews from Poland and 
in the story of the Exodus. 
The first step in such a program is the adoption 
of the principle that it is the conviction of the world 
Jewish community that these people must go to 
Palestine. The second step is the transmittal of that 
policy to the Displaced Persons. The third step is for 
the world Jewish community to offer the people the 
opportunity to go to Palestine. By opportunity it is to 
be understood that any means put at the disposal of the 
people is to be considered an adequate opportunity. 
Those who are not interested are no longer to be 
considered wards of the Jewish community to be 
maintained in camps, fed and clothed without their 
having to make any contribution to their own 
subsistence. To effect this program, it becomes 
necessary for the Jewish community at large to reverse 
its policy and instead of creating comforts for the 
Displaced Persons to make them as uncomfortable as 
possible. The American Joint Distribution Committee 
supplies should be withdrawn. I have taken the time to 
indicate the type of help that the Joint has been 
giving. My purpose was to be able to indicate that the 
supplementary aid of the Joint be termed 'luxury items' 
in that this aid serves as a means to put the 
individual in business. A further procedure would call 
for an organization such as the Haganah to harass the 
Jew. Utilities would be tampered with and all 
protection now given by the Adviser on Jewish Affairs, 
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DP Chaplains, and Agency personnel be withdrawn. Of 
course, it is to be understood that there are certain 
problems that persist even in the most normal of 
societies which must be cared for by one or more 
agencies. 
It must be borne in mind that we are dealing with 
a sick people. They are not to be asked, but to be 
told, what to do. They will be thankful in the years to 
come. Too many times have I been cursed in the evening, 
while moving masses of people, only to be thanked the 
following morning for having transferred them from an 
abominable site to a more comfortable location. The 
cooperation of all agencies is important. The principle 
must be whole-heartedly accepted by all Agencies 
involved. The AJDC must set aside the funds now 
allocated to Germany to be used for the execution of 
this program. If this program is not accepted, let me 
assure this Conference that an incident will occur 
which will compel the American Jewish community to 
reconsider its policy and make the changes herein 
suggested. At that time, there will have been much more 
suffering, a greater wave of Anti-Semitism and a 
tougher struggle to accomplish what might perhaps be 
accomplished today.(67.) 
Although it is clear that Klausner's report does not 
represent the mainstream of Zionist strategy with regard to 
the DPs, his report is still instructive to the issues at 
hand (and the most practical means of dealing with the 
problems). Klausner believed that since the DPs were sick 
people they needed help in making decisions. They must be 
moved to Palestine, whether they wanted to or not. His 
recommendations were followed, at least in part. 
William Haber, the Adviser on Jewish Affairs to the 
zonal commander at the time of the Klausner report, 
disagreed with Klausner's radical approach, although he did 
agree that the DPs ought to be evacuated. He "took issue 
with the suggestion that the DPs be made uncomfortable and 
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be harassed. Mr. Haber referred to the 'somewhat compulsory 
form' of conscription for the Palestine Army that already 
was being applied in the camps, and to the 'social 
pressures' used to persuade young and able-bodied DPs 'to 
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volunteer' for the Haganah." The recruiting poster which 
was displayed in the camps is ample evidence of the truth of 
Haber's statements. The Jewish Agency employed Klausner's 
suggestion of withdrawing financial support to those who did 
not want to go to Palestine. The Reports of the Executive of 
the Jewish Agency states: "In these countries [bordering 
Austria] there have remained several thousand Jews who do 
not wish, or in their opinion are unable to immigrate [to 
Israel], but the Jewish Agency does not continue to deal 
69 
with them." 
The CCLJ felt animosity to anyone not pursuing Zionist 
goals. Herbert Agar writes, "...the committee was hostile 
toward the German-born Jews who had returned to their homes 
from the camps or from some lucky, undiscovered hiding 
place. It thought all Jews should stay and work together 
until they forced their way into Palestine. Jews who chose 
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to go 'outside' and live in Germany deserved no help." 
U.S. labor leader Louis Nelson in a letter in The New Leader 
August 21, 1948 wrote that there was a general campaign "to 
force displaced persons to accept Zionism, to join the 
Palestine Jewish Army, and to give up legitimate 
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differences." 
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Reports of social pressure and outright coercion mar 
the record of Zionist efforts in the camps. They call to 
question whether the real interests of the DPs are reflected 
in the reports coming from camp committees controlled by 
Zionists. There is no doubt, however, that many earnestly 
wanted to go to Palestine. But how many of these people were 
convinced to do so before they had been exposed to the 
unremitting Zionist propaganda in the Camps? This propaganda 
came in many forms. 
Six Jewish relief organizations ministered to the 
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needs of the DPs. The aid came not only in the form of 
food but also in much needed attempts to rebuild the hope 
and purpose of a shattered people. The relief organizations 
developed cultural and educational programs. Often, 
education centered around Palestine. Specifically, Zionist 
educators taught Hebrew, Palestinian songs, trades that were 
in demand in Palestine, and other subjects designed to 
accentuate Palestine. Even slogans such as "Palestine needs 
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healthy people" were used to promote better personal 
hygiene. This type of education augmented exposure to 
Zionist principles even if in the context of better mental 
health. The Zionist program was able to give the DPs hope 
and a sense of purpose, and at the same time continue to 
promote emigration to Palestine. Nadich, the Adviser on 
Jewish Affairs for Eisenhower, assisted in this process. He 
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called Moshe Shertok tof "the Jewish Agency] in London and 
requested that Shertok immediately send from Palestine 
agriculturalists and "a number of teachers who could 
instruct the DPs in Hebrew and other subjects." Nadich also 
requested that Shertok send Palestinian "textbooks and 
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educational and cultural materials of all kinds." A 
constant stream of positive information about Palestine 
continued to implore the DPs to go to Palestine. 
The CCLJ emphasized preparing the younger adults and 
children for Palestine. "Within the camps here they (youth 
group leaders) have organized communal groups (Kibbutzim) 
whose aim it is to work, train themselves to become a 
productive element, acquire general and Hebrew knowledge, 
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and ultimately emigrate to Palestine." To further the 
operation of the Kibbutzim the Jewish Agency acquired farms 
where the Kibbutzim could gain work experience in a communal 
setting, similar to kibbutzim in Palestine. These "farms" 
also often covertly housed military training sites and so 
proved doubly useful . 
The Jewish Agency for Palestine "threw many of its 
personnel into unaccompanied children centers which were 
established to take care of several thousand orphaned 
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infiltrees in the summer of 1946." The UNRRA report on 
these camps goes on to say that JAFP personnel, who 
represented Palestine to the DPs, promoted activities which 
on the whole were slanted toward Palestine. "Thus JAFP 
organized agricultural projects and placed much emphasis on 
education (for life in Palestine) from the very 
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beginning." The "Survey of Conditions of Jews in the 
British Zone of Germany in March 1946" summed up the typical 
British reaction to Zionist education in the camps: "We 
cannot refrain from referring to the criticisms of a senior 
UNKRA official who found fault with the emphasis which was 
being placed on Palestine and Hebrew in the schools at 
Belsen. This he considered as political propaganda. Rightly 
or wrongly, the Belsen people decided on this type of 
education for their children, we assume because most of the 
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people wish to emigrate to Palestine." One could also 
explain that "emphasis... was being placed on Palestine and 
Hebrew" because the camp committees determined the cultural 
life of the camp, and would naturally choose an education 
which most successfully promulgated Zionist principles. 
Demonstrations before the Anglo-American Committee of 
Inquiry reveal how extensive and pervasive the Zionist 
propaganda could be. Richard Crossman, during his 
investigation of the camps, noticed that the Jewish 
delegations which met with the committee often made similar 
speeches and carried banners with identical slogans. At one 
camp 600-700 people marched in military fashion carrying 
banners while groups of children marched by in pairs 
carrying a banner that said "Down with the White Paper" and 
a group of young men carried one that said that the 
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committee was "an insult to the Jewish Nation." 
The camps, organized under the zealously Zionist CCLJ 
and ultimately under the control of the shlihim from 
Palestine, became bastions of Zionism. This control was so 
strong that the Harrison and Anglo-American commissions 
perceived the camps to be virtually unanimous in their 
clamor for Palestine. Their reports, however, were not 
representative of the DPs actual wishes. Since the local 
committees processed most of the reports and administered 
the polls, the results were slanted. 
A good indication of where the DPs actually wanted to 
go would be where they finally went. If the great majority 
actually ended up going to Israel, then the earlier 
estimates of where the DPs wanted to go would be essentially 
correct. Another major factor to consider before looking at 
numbers is the relative ease that each of the options 
allowed. 
After the UN vote to partition Palestine, in November 
1947, the DPs knew that they would be able to go to 
Palestine. The endless wondering was over, it was simply a 
matter of time. Once the Jewish State had come into being, 
all the DPs would be received. Massive immigration to Israel 
could begin after the British terminated the Mandate and 
pulled out on May 14, 1948. However, visas to other 
destinations before this date was very difficult to obtain 
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and limited. In fact only 12,649 Jewish DPs were able to 
immigrate to the United States in the period from May 1946 -
80 
October 1948. Hence virtually all of the DPs could have 
gone to Israel if they had wanted to. But in fact, most of 
the 80,000 Jewish DPs who finally went to the United States 
had to wait in the camps, with every opportunity to emigrate 
to Israel, until United States immigration laws were 
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liberalized by the DP Act of 1950 effective June 1, 1950. 
Conversely, since the borders of the United States had 
remained closed to the Jewish DPs for so long, "Jews who 
might otherwise have chosen the United States as their place 
of resettlement went to Israel or to whatever other nation 
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would have them." Of the 250,000 Jewish DPs in the 
European camps, HIAS (Hebrew Immigration and Aid Society) 
reports rendering assistance to 79,675 immigrants to the 
United States, 24,049 to the British Dominions, and 24,806 
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to Latin American countries. 128,530 out of the total 
250,000 DPs went to a country other than Israel when they 
had a clear choice to go to Israel. Over one half of the DPs 
ended up in a country other than Israel even when they had a 
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clear (and later) reasonably safe option to do so. 
Abraham S. Hyman, the Jewish Adviser to the zonal 
commander said in late 1947: 
The emergence of the Jewish State has, in my opinion, 
not substantially affected the "Drang nach Amerika." I 
would say that now, given equal opportunity to go to 
Palestine and to the States, 50% would join tne 
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unfortunate Galuth Jews in America.(85.) 
Jewish Agency personnel agreed with Hyman's estimate as 
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well. The findings of the various committees of inquiry 
do not mesh with what actually happened. Yehuda Bauer 
fronted this explanation for the discrepancy: "More than two 
years of camp life had caused a severe deterioration of tne 
DPs morale. The urge to go to Palestine had weakened, and 
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many wanted to go to the United States instead." According 
to Bauer, the DPs had routinely chosen Palestine over any 
other destination by a very large margin, but, finally, 
after over two years in the camps, when the victory for 
their state had finally been won, when they no longer needed 
to wonder if and when they could live a normal life, then, 
"their urge to go to Palestine weakened" and about 50% 
decided that they would rather go to the United States given 
the opportunity. Indeed about 25% were willing to wait in 
uncertainty a bit longer in the hope that they could come to 
the United States. Bauer's explanation may not be all-
encompassing. Rather, it is likely that a large number of 
the DPs, perhaps one half, had wanted to go to a country 
other than Palestine to begin with. 
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I l l  
Chapter Four, the Brichah 
A remnant of Polish Jews, approximately 250,000, 
successfully escaped the fate of their co-religionists. Many 
who had hid in the forests or who had fled to the Soviet 
Union came back to reclaim their property and lives after 
the war. It soon became apparent however that life in Poland 
would prove difficult. The Holocaust had destroyed the 
possibility of a normal life in Poland. Many reported that 
they felt totally unable to pick up the threads of their 
previous lives; Poland was only a cemetery now, filled with 
the ghosts of millions of murdered Jews. How could one hope 
to build a happy and peaceful life surrounded by such 
specters? As the threat of new anti-Semitism began to 
manifest itself, the survivors wanted to quit the land 
forever. This then is the foundation for the Brichah, the 
Flight. The remnants of Polish Jewry wanted to flee from the 
land of annihilation to a promised and proffered new hope. 
1 
There is no question that the "Brichah," had its 
foundation in legitimate fears. After the Holocaust, Polish 
Jews did have a great deal to fear. The traditional anti-
Semitism of many of the Polish people had been exacerbated 
by years of Nazi propaganda and did not die simply because 
the Nazis had been defeated. However, one should not assume 
that the mass exodus of 1946 only came from spontaneous 
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motivations. The Brichah was far more than simply a result 
of lingering anti-Semitism which surfaced in persecution. 
This chapter will consider other causes of the Brichah and 
their connection to Zionist goals. It will outline other 
issues as well: the actual degree of persecution, the extent 
of Zionist propaganda to emphasize the persecution, the 
method of Brichah operatives in encouraging the migrations, 
the wishes of the refugees with regard to their final 
destination, and finally, how and why the Zionists 
represented these wishes as being exclusively for Palestine. 
The official representatives from the Jewish Agency 
(shlichim) working under the authority of the Mossad leader­
ship in Paris (and thus directly under Jewish Agency author­
ity) encouraged the flight from Poland. These representa­
tives formed a subsidiary of the Mossad which took as its 
name "Brichah." They encouraged flight from Poland for a 
variety of reasons. By increasing the size of the DP camps, 
they could continue to put pressure on the United States to 
address the issue of Palestine. The DP camps became a "poli­
tical fact" which gave validity to Zionist claims for the 
need for a Jewish State. Since the Mossad was responsible 
for illegal immigration, it needed good "human material" 
willing to sail in precarious vessels, almost certainly to 
be detained by the British. This operation had invaluable 
propagandistic value, as we have seen by the Exodus inci­
dent. Even though the British seized most of these ships and 
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placed the passengers in camps on Cyprus, their presence in 
Cyprus created an important reserve of fighters who could 
immigrate to the new state as soon as it was founded. 
Potentially good fighters could also be sent to special 
camps and "farms," mostly in Italy, where young Jews could 
be trained and then sent to Palestine. A flight from Poland 
would also provide potential new immigrants for the hoped-
for Jewish State. An increase in the Jewish population of 
the future state was a prerequisite for its survival. For 
these reasons, Brichah operatives encouraged Polish Jews to 
flee from Poland. 
Brichah agents encouraged the flight by "stressing the 
terror angle" and exaggerating the degree of current per­
secution. They did not create the paranoia, but rather fan­
ned it into a panic which would impel Polish Jewry to leave. 
Brichah agents also facilitated the departure by painting a 
glowing portrait of the conditions in the American Zone in 
Germany, and of the imminent emigration possibilities from 
there. Once people had determined to leave, Brichah agents 
financed and supervised the transportation. Since the Polish 
government had forbidden emigration out of Poland and the 
United States had forbidden any new immigration into the 
U.S. zone of occupation, all the facets of the transporta­
tion had to managed in secrecy. 
Abraham Sachar's boox, The Redemption of the Unwanted, 
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conveys the impression that a great majority of Poles wanted 
to continue anti-Semitic practices in Poland: "The general 
population remained hostile to any Jewish settlement, even 
by former neighbors. They expressed their hostilities with 
increasing insult and violence. A common note was sounded: 
'If only Hitler had finished the job of the Final Solu-
2 
tion. In a press conference in November 1946, Rabbi Bern­
stein, the Jewish Adviser to the American Zonal Commander 
said essentially the same thing: pogroms were rampant in 
Poland. 
I remain convinced that the motive for movement is 
genuine and spontaneous. People who have moved that way 
have not come through any organized program. The 
primary cause of their moving have been the pogroms in 
Poland threatening their lives and those of their 
families. The whole atmosphere in Poland is hostile and 
left them with the feeling of desperation. They want to 
resettle somewhere away from violent anti-Semitism.(3.J 
But, one might very well question this opinion. How exten­
sive was the persecution in Poland? Was it simply an exten­
sion of Nazi sentiments or did it have other causes? 
There were three main reasons for the persecution of 
Jews in Poland. Many Poles threatened returning Jews so that 
the Jews would not try to regain their property. Jewish 
property had been sold during the war and the new owners did 
not want to relinquish it. In order to keep the property, 
the new owners threatened, and often employed, violence. 
Poles also linked the Jews to the new and hated Lublin gov­
ernment which had placed an inordinately large number of 
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Jews in high posts. Since the majority of the Polish people 
were Koman Catholic and opposed to communism, Jews had more 
opportunity to rise to prominence in the new government. 
Therefore the non-Jewish Poles began to tie the new commu­
nist government to Jews in general. This attitude toward the 
Jews often gave anti-government riots an anti-Jewish flavor. 
It was easy for the Poles to see the new government, with 
its high number of Jewish-born officials, as yet another 
manifestation of Jewish strategy for the domination of Po­
land. For many Poles, the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" 
provided the basis for understanding the tendencies of the 
Jewish community; this belief then was exacerbated by the 
apparent Jewish control of the Lublin government. 
On December 13, 1945, H.W. Emerson, the director of 
IGCR (the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees), in a 
letter to embassy officals in the United Kingdom, outlined 
the causes of Polish post-war anti-Semitism: 
There was strong anti-Semitism in Poland before the 
war, and this was increased by German propaganda during 
the occupation; in some of the concentration camps 
Polish Jews were very badly treated by non-Jewish Poles 
who were used by the Germans to carry out their brutal 
policy; the property of Jews in Poland, as elsewhere, 
was confiscated; much of it now is in the hands of non-
Jewish Poles who are afraid that it may be taken from 
them and restored to the original owners; this fear is 
a direct encouragement of the natural anti-Semitism and 
is probably the single most powerful factor in the 
alleged widespread feeling among the population that 
the present time affords a good opportunity of getting 
rid of the Jews. (4.) 
The Lublin government tried to insure the security of 
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its Jewish constituency since the Jews would be, if not its 
best source of support among the people, then at least not 
antagonistic. The new government needed as much support as 
it could get since "it was perfectly obvious that the major­
ity of the population, and especially the peasants, were 
5 
very much opposed to the government." The government, how­
ever was not yet strong enough to insure Jewish security. 
The presence of Jews in powerful positions naturally 
added to the belief that Jews controlled the government. 
Specifically, two Jews held powerful positions in the new 
government. Jakub Berman and Hilary Burke held the positions 
'"of Minister of Interior and Minister of Economic Planning. 
The fact of their Jewish origin served as a butt for the 
attacks of the WIN [the successor party for the right-wing 
A.K., Armja Krajowa] and fascist NSZ [the Narodowe Sily 
Zbrojowe party] on the regime. Jews and communists were 
equated by right-wing propagandists in the well-worn Nazi 
manner. The Jew-hatred of many Poles, and especially among 
the peasantry, was now whipped up for anti-government 
6 
attacks. One could also look at this differently. Bauer 
maintains that WIN and NSZ leadership led attacks against 
the government by appealing to the Jew-hatred among the 
people. It is also conceivable that the hatred of communism 
caused anti-Jewish attacks. Since Jews had powerful 
positions in the hated government, the NSZ and WIN sought to 
attack the government by attacking its most supportive 
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population group. Whatever the ultimate reason, the NSZ was 
responsible for much of the anti-Jewish action. 
Many of the "pogroms" were later found to be fundament­
ally anti-government riots. In a report to under-Secretary 
of State Acheson, Elbridge Durbrow wrote, "Mikolajczyk Cthe 
former head of the Polish government in exile] stated that 
in two supposed pogroms which were widely reported as po­
groms he had been present in the cities when the disturb­
ances took place and found that both of them were definitely 
7 
anti-government riots rather than anti-Jewish." These same 
sentiments were echoed by Cardinal August Hlond, Primate of 
Poland, following the Kielce pogrom during which 41 Jews had 
been killed. 
The responsibility that [the situation] is 
deteriorating lies in a great measure on the Jews who 
remain in Poland on preferential bases in governmental 
affairs and who tend to impose forms of organization 
which the enormous majority of the people do not want. 
That is a harmful game, because from this, dangerous 
tensions arise. In fatal armed encounters on the 
political battle front in Poland some Jews perish I 
regret to say, but far more Poles perish.(8.) 
Robert Murphy (the US Political Adviser for Germany) 
sent a report to the Department of State which summarized 
his investigation into the reasons for Jewish emigration 
from Poland. Many people talked of scattered examples of 
violence perpetrated especially by the NSZ against Jews. 
Many simply feared the possibility of violence. The report 
outlined several specific examples of which the following 
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was one: 
Jablonsky, a physician and a full Colonel in [the] 
Polish Army who had demobilized a month ago and left 
Lublin for the sake of his daughter. Stated to be 
intelligent and in appearance not at all Jewish. 
Persecution of Jews in general has induced him to leave 
Poland. He includes clergy among those who are anti-
Semitic, which he believes is based on distrust of 
those high government officials who are Jewish. He also 
thinks much of anti-Semitism is deliberately fostered 
and supported by money and material from some 
underground movement with ulterior motives.(9.) 
The U.S. Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, 
conferred with two prominent Jewish leaders on the "influx 
of Polish Jews into U.S. occupied zones of Germany." Both of 
10 
these men were associated with the government. In a cable 
to the Secretary of State on January 11, 1946, Lane wrote 
that they reported to him that the "reports of ill-treatment 
of Polish Jews [is] greatly exaggerated. No pogroms." The 
exagerated stories were told to justify the departure from 
Poland. Lane continued that the reason Jews were leaving 
Poland was psychological. "They do not wish to remain in a 
country which to them is a cemetery with three million Jews 
dead." Finally, he said that the Zionist movement, 
especially the principal Zionist pary, (Poalej-Syon) was 
12 
encouraging the exodus. 
Three days later Ambassador interviewed several people 
and reported on four of them. The interviews indicated that 
Zionists were assembling Jews in Lodz and persuading them to 
go to the American zone from whence they could proceed to 
Palestine. One of those interviewed, Mr. Piraton, a Jew, 
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Communist, British medical doctor and a non-Zionist, sug­
gested that the "emigrants would be equally content to go to 
the US or Palestine." He also claimed "that there was no 
foundation for reports of actual persecution" and that "the 
major motivation for the flight was psychological rather 
than physical or economic." Lane also had "extensive talks" 
with Jacoe Pot, the past Secretary of the Jewish Labor 
Commission. Pot said that the major reasons for the flight 
were that the people A.) had enough of Communism, B.) did 
not wish to remain in a cemetery, C.) were escaping a bad 
economic situation, and D.J were afforded easy escape by the 
Zionist network. Lane went on to say, "All informants ex­
pressed that the charges of emigrant Polish Jews 
[regarding] persecution and pogroms are for the purpose of 
13 
justifying their departure." 
There is absolutely no question that there was signifi­
cant persecution of the Jews in Poland. Most of this persec­
ution, however, occurred on an individual basis. There is 
little evidence of widespread pogroms even though there was 
a sustained and persistent rumor to that effect. Phillip 
Skorneck, who worked with the JDC, having interviewing about 
1000 of the Polish Jewish refugees after they arrived in 
Berlin, spoke of his findings with Judge Rifkmd, the Ad­
viser on Jewish Affairs, Ilya Dijour, head of the Hebrew 
Shelter and Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), and officials with 
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the American Army. A report of the meeting was sent to the 
State Department: 
[Most of the refugees] are well dressed and well 
fed and have given up comfortable homes and businesses 
in an effort to flee what they believe to be impending 
danger at the hands of a hostile population... 
According to this report the movement to Berlin starts 
at Lodz where he [Skorneck] believes there is an 
organized scheme for the migration of the refugees. He 
states that the refugees did not originate in Lodz 
which was merely a collecting point and that the 
refugees admitted under questioning that they 
understood from Jewish contacts in Lodz that they would 
be assisted in their migration if they could go to 
Berlin.... Based on his interviews, the POW and DP 
representative stated that the story of persecution did 
not stand up under interrogation. Two actually 
witnessed acts of violence, one had witnessed a 
pogrom...at Krakow...but he arrived at the scene 1/2 
hour after it had occurred. The POW and DP 
representative states however, that it is obvious that 
a sincere fear of persecution does exist among the 
refugees, and that this relates of hatred of long 
standing between the Polish population and the 
Jews.(14 . ) 
The initial stages of the Brichah were fueled by 
small-scale violent acts, personal threats, and a pervasive 
desire to leave the cemetery of their co-religionists. 
During this, stage emigration proceeded at a relatively slow 
pace. 3,502 left Poland in May 1946 and the pace picked up 
somewhat when about 8,000 left in June. However, after the 
Kielce pogrom on July 4, 1946, the rate of emigration accel­
erated. In the 3 months following the Kielce pogrom, Bauer 
estimates, between 90,000 and 95,000 Eastern European Jews 
15 
emigrated to Germany, Austria, and Italy. It was the 
Kielce Pogrom more than anything else that fueled the mass 
exodus of Jews out of Poland into the DP camps. In the end 
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41 Jews were dead and dozens more wounded at Kielce. The 
news of the pogrom spread quickly and raised anxieties to a 
feverish level. "Caught between Communism and its right-wing 
opposition, the vast majority of Jews felt that Poland had 
become too inhospitable to tarry there longer than was abso-
16 
lutely necessary." What had before been a nagging concern 
became a panic. At this point propaganda was no longer 
needed. 
Regardless of whether the persecution of the Jews had 
primarily anti-government or anti-Semitic origins, it had 
the same impact on the Jewish population. The main question 
that needs to be considered is the extent to which Zionist 
workers exaggerated this fear in order to encourage mass 
migration. 
Bauer implies that just such a "panic psychology" was 
used by the Zionists in Poland: "Rabbi Bernstein urged that 
no panic psychology 'to save the Jews of Poland' should be 
encouraged, and in this he clearly took a line differing 
from that of the Zionists. A deliberate program to get all 
the Jews to leave Poland would be 'unwise, impractical and 
17 
dangerous.'" This panic psychology could easily be 
produced by exaggerating the degree of persecution. Zionist 
papers naturally would have stressed (and as Bauer implied, 
did stress) any anti-semitism. Ambassador Lane sent this 
report, "Rzymowski (a Polish government contact) said that 
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because of identical reports of alleged events in Poland, 
such as the reported pogrom in Krakow last August, it is 
clear that propaganda is being built up outside of 
18 
Poland." This same tendency to exaggerate the persecution 
was very apparent in Germany: an undercover agent sent to 
investigate the cause of the mass movement of Polish Jews 
reported that "Zionist papers in Germany do matte efforts to 
19 
play up the terror angle." 
Zionist workers were active in propagandistic work in 
Poland. "At the railway stations in Warsaw or Lodz, propa­
gandists of the Central Committee and those of the Zionists 
20 
competed quite openly for new-comers." Brichah agents 
painted a glowing picture of the situation in the American 
Zone. Murphy wrote, "Apparent here that Polish Jews now 
leaving Poland are misled by some agency or individuals as 
to expectation of conditions in US zone Germany... Claimed 
promises made them in Poland would give them houses of 
21 
German Jews taken away from Jews by Nazis." Schwarz re­
ports that "people arriving from Poland [in July 1946] 
revealed that Brichah functionaries had told them that they 
would be able to leave for Palestine after a stay of six to 
22 
eight weeks in Germany." Major Irving Heymont, the Ameri­
can camp commander at Landsberg, wrote in his diary: 
This morning I spoke to some new arrivals from 
Poland. They said that a rumor is current in Poland 
that all Jews in the American zone are to be evacuated 
to Palestine shortly, but that Jews living in Poland 
will not be allowed to leave.(23.) They also said that 
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all the Jews in Poland are either on the way or 
preparing to come to the American zone. Their story 
jibes with so many others that I have heard. In 
addition there are groups from Palestine over here who 
are actively organizing the movement of Jews from 
eastern Europe to Palestine.(24.) 
Murphy's undercover agent had said earlier "by their own 
confession, many refugees would never started out, if they 
25 
had been aware of the actual prospects." 
Prominent Zionists in Poland refused to support laws 
which would have assured "equitable and favorable treatment 
of Jews in Poland." The Zionists realized that fewer Polish 
Jews would seek to go to Palestine if they were not in dang­
er. In a report to Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson, 
Elbridge Durbrow wrote: 
Dr. Sommerstein, ta prominent Zionist in the 
Lublin government](26.) had refused to accept Mr. 
Mikolajczyk's suggestion that it might be advisable to 
pass certain decrees assuring equitable and favorable 
treatment of Jews in Poland. Dr. Sommerstein stated 
that he was not in favor of encouraging Jews to remain 
in Poland and desired to have them obtain permission to 
emigrate to Palestine.(27.) 
In order to encourage immigration to Palestine, Dr. 
Sommerstein was willing to leave his people in danger. A 
more straightforward statement of Zionist strategy in Poland 
could not have been made. Durbrow went on to say: 
I cannot but feel that there is a very strong 
possibility that the entire movement is planned and if 
allowed to go on, will cause us increased embarrass­
ment. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that if 
this is a planned movement, it may be part of a scheme 
to further complicate the Arab-Jewish situation in the 
Near East by forcing us to insist that the large 
numbers of Polish Jews in our zone in Germany should be 
sent to Palestine.(28.) 
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A report from Ambassador Lane concurred with Durbrow: 
Both Rzymowski and Olszewski [contacts in the Polish 
Government] expressed the opinion that [the] emigration 
[is] organized for political reasons and primarily to 
influence U.S. Government to encourage Great Britain to 
open Palestine to Polish Jews.(29.) 
Tom Segev in his book 1949, The First Israelis estab­
lishes that Mossad operatives intentionally increased ten­
sions in some countries in order to encourage immigration to 
Israel. (see chapter two) Even though Segev is primarily 
concerned with events in 1949 and 1950, a period past the 
purview of this study, Segev's evidence, nevertheless, is 
instructive. The strategies employed to further immigration 
would not have changed substantially in two years. Also, a 
large number of Mossad leaders and operatives who worked in 
postwar Europe continued with Mossad in 1949 and 1950. In an 
extraordinarily revealing passage, Segev demonstrates the 
machinations of Mossad agents who were responsible for 
assisting immigration to Israel once the state had come into 
existence. The Israeli ambassador to Czechoslovakia, Shmuel 
Eliashiv, suggested that Israel should employ the same 
tactics which had been used in Poland. 
It turns out that a good many of the people do not 
intend to proceed to Israel. This has been the cause of 
much embarrassment and has resulted in difficulties to 
our people in. Vienna and we've been asked to stop the 
operation we have been carrying on so far. We do not 
intend to follow this advice, but the situation calls 
for some thought. Of course if we could obtain mass 
emigration, we could send the people directly to the 
port so they would not be able to stop en route. That 
is what has been done and is being done in Poland. But 
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here the question arises, Is our expenditure of energy 
and nerve in recent time worth it for people who only 
wish to make use of us for their personal interests, 
and who can only be brought to Israel by force?(30.) 
This letter raises several issues. Apparently the Mossad 
agents had been successful at "obtaining mass emigration in 
Poland." Apparently they were not beyond bringing 
immigrants "to Israel by force." In fact the chairman of the 
Zionist Executive at one of the Executive's meetings said 
"Even Jews who don't wish to leave must be forced to 
31 
come." Also as Segev wrote, "It appears that this Israeli 
diplomat did not feel that Israel had a human, Jewish 
Zionist duty to save Jews in distress irrespective of their 
final destination, but only insofar as the operation 
32 
promoted the interests of Israel and served its purposes." 
One of Dr. Eliashiv's colleagues in Vienna felt the 
same way. Referring to the problem, of Jews who did not want 
to go to Israel he wrote, "If the political situation causes 
them distress and makes them want to leave Vienna, then it 
is our business to make use of this distress to get them to 
go to Israel, and not to alleviate it by helping them to 
33 
move to the refugee camps in the American sector." All 
this is reminiscent of Zionist work in the DP camps, and 
confirms that the Klausner report was not unique in its 
machiavellian tone. 
The Brichah had enormous importance for the future 
creation of the State of Israel. As Bauer said, "This mass 
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flight...had an important place in the developments leading 
34 
to the establishment of Israel." 
Since Italy quickly became saturated with Jewish DPs, 
Zionist strategists had to find another location where they 
could amass the refugees and which would have political 
35 
value once large numbers of Jews were gathered there. The 
Brichah leadership in Poland suggested Germany and Austria. 
They thought the American zone of the occupation was the 
only place where the Jewish survivors could get the 
appropriate physical care. It is probable that by this time 
(Aug. 1945), another motive behind such reasoning was to 
create a political fact by concentrating the refugees in one 
place. The Palestinian regiments in the British Army reached 
a similar conclusion and they too began to direct people to 
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the American zone. 
The Brichah also helped Zionist fundraisers as is shown 
by this "memo o.f conversation" between Dr. Goldman and Dean 
Acheson on February 13, 1946: 
Dr. Goldman stated also that a meeting of the 
American Jewish Council will be held in Cleveland about 
March 15 in connection with the effort to raise $100 
million in 1946 for relief for the Jews in Europe, and 
he hoped that Mr. Acheson would give him a reassuring 
statement that the status quo with respect to Polish 
Jewish infiltrees would be maintained at least until 
May 1, 1946. (37 . ) 
When the Jewish Adviser to the zonal commander. Judge 
Rifkind, left Europe in March 1946, the CCLJ was fearful 
lest the flow of the people from Poland be stopped by "high 
policy decisions of Allied governments.'' Even without the 
presence of the important position of the Jewish Adviser, 
the members of the CCLJ knew that something had to be done. 
The safety and sanity of the Jews of Poland demanded that 
they emigrate, and their temporary settlement in Germany 
would strengthen the demand for statehood in Palestine. It 
was this picture that Grmberg [President of the CCLJ J 
presented to the committeemen at their regular weekly 
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meeting after Rifkmd's departure. Grmberg and the CCLJ 
knew that the presence of the DPs in the U.S. zone was a 
vital political issue. This Knowledge prompted the CCLJ's 
following actions. 
One of the chief representatives of the 
underground, Brichah, known only as "Ernst," filled in 
the details indicating that no obstacle would deter the 
movement. What was to be done? First, it was decided, 
telegrams must be sent to General Hiildring in Washing­
ton and General McNarney in Frankfurt, asking for the 
immediate implementation of the open-door policy for 
refugees (which had been stated to General McNarney in 
Washington) and requesting a replacement for Judge 
Rifkind. Secondly, intervention at UNRRA headquarters 
must be initiated in order to prevent the imminent 
return of refugees to Poland.(39.) Thirdly, a committee 
was appointed to survey the camps and determine how 
much room could be made for newcomers and urge the 
people to make every sacrifice to house and feed them. 
Fourth, in order to facilitate the Committee's 
operations, the question of its recognition must be 
pressed on every possible occasion.(40.) 
Although it was clear that the Jewish people faced 
persecution in Poland, it is also clear that without the 
covert organization, Brichah, the mass migration would not 
have occurred. Brichah operatives not only conducted suc-
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cessful operations m assisting migration out of Poland to 
Germany, Austria, and Italy but they also encouraged Polish 
Jews to leave. They were at least partially responsible for 
adding to the sense of panic in Poland that contributed to 
the mass exodus. They also encouraged individuals to choose 
to go to Palestine over all alternatives. In fact at times 
refused to help those who openly wished to go elsewhere. 
Teveth writes that Ben-Gurion made a distinction between 
"those Jews we can bring out of Europe over here, and those 
whom we cannot bring over here." JAFP funds were to De used 
41 
only for rescue by immigration to Palestine. 
The military expended considerable effort to find out 
if there was an underground movement assisting the Jewish 
exodus out of Poland. Although no subsequent reports could 
conclusively prove the existence of such an effort, the 
suspicion was not dispelled. 
In November 1945, Robert Murphy, (U.S. Political 
Adviser for Germany) wrote, "in view of the stories told, 
42 
POW and DP members have a suspicion bordering on 
conviction but incapable of proof, that the westward flow of 
43 
Polish Jews is an organized movement." Alexander C. 
44 
Kirk, wrote in December 1945 "A.C. [Allied Council] has 
expressed the view that this movement is part of a very 
large organization with the object of using Italy and 
Austria as a 'Transit camp' between central Europe and 
45 
Palestine." It is important to note that Brichah carefully 
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screened the "human material" and directed those most useful 
to the future state, especially as potential soldiers, to go 
to those areas where they could most quickly emigrate to 
Palestine, either immediately, via an Aliyah Beth snip or 
4b 
as soon as the state came into existence. 
A letter from the American Embassy in Warsaw said, "It 
appears that much of the Jewish migration has been with the 
aid of formal or informal Jewish committees at the point of 
departure, often rumored at Lodz, at points on both sides of 
the frontiers, at places en route, and at the destination 
47 
generally the American Zone of Occupation." 
It is interesting to note, however, that one of Mur­
phy's subordinates reported in concert with the Zionist 
position. "Great persecution in Poland... Most want to go to 
Palestine (80%)... No evidence could be found which would 
indicate any organization responsible for getting the Jews 
46 
from Poland into Berlin." Such a report, finding "no 
evidence" regarding a covert organization, is, in light of 
the other reports, highly suspect. 
Although most high level personnel accepted the exis­
tence of some "underground" organization, any public state­
ment to this effect was political suicide. General Sir Fred­
erick Morgan, the British head of UNRRA DP operations in 
Germany, incurred the wrath of Zionist sympathizers world­
wide for just this reason. During the question and answer 
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session of his Press conference on January 2, 19 46 he ex­
pressed the opinion that the immigration of Polish Jews was 
part of a well-organized plan carried out by a secret organ­
ization; that UNRRA officials had been unable to find a 
single concrete example of a pogrom inside Poland; and that 
the people who were arriving in Germany appeared to be "well 
dressed, well fed, rosy cheeked and have plenty of money. 
They certainly do not look like persecuted people." Morgan 
also added that he felt the exodus of Jews from Poland was 
linked to the problem of Palestine. Morgan attributed all of 
this to a Zionist scheme to get all the Jews out of Europe. 
He continued by saying that the Jews were growing into a 
49 
"world force." Although this phrase was clearly too strong 
and poorly chosen, the rest of what he had said was not 
anything new or particularly outrageous. And yet Zionist 
sympathizers world-wide were livid. Stephen Wise, President 
of the American World Jewish Congress, called Morgan's 
statement "shamelessly partisan," and declared that "it not 
only savours of Nazism at its worst, but goes back to the 
50 
Elders of Zion forgery of a century ago." A spokesman for 
AZEC termed Morgan's comments "an outrageous libel against 
the Jewish people. General Morgan appears to have been in 
Germany long enough to assimilate the Hitlerian propaganda 
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about 'World Jewish plots.'" London officials of JAFP 
stated that they had no knowledge of any plan to get Jews 
52 
out of Europe or move them to Palestine. And yet, JAFP was 
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ultimately in charge of both the Brichah operation and the 
illegal immigration work of the Mossad / Aiiyah Beth. On 
January 6, 1946, L.S.B. Shapiro, a New York Times 
correspondent in Berlin, wrote: "This correspondent... is of 
the opinion that both journalism and Jewry has so wildly 
interpreted and elaborated upon Sir Frederick's remarks that 
his well-reasoned original thesis has been almost completely 
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obscured and as a result is being pilloried." 
It is highly ironic that the basic substance of his 
statements have now proven to be true. However, at the time, 
most people, having been so deeply shocked by the disclosure 
of the Holocaust, would have nothing to do with any state­
ments hinting at a Jewish "secret organization," or that was 
reminiscent of Nazi propaganda. Schwarz wrote, "The 
suggestion of conspiracy had disagreeable overtones. 
Anticipating the world reaction of the press, the Committee 
at Siebertstrasse (the CCLJ) denounced the statement and 
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called for his dismissal." Although the suggestion of a 
conspiracy or "plot" was indeed impolitic to the extreme and 
misleading, the substance of the statement was essentially 
correct. General Morgan and other UNRKA officials, however, 
had no way of knowing how extensive the Zionist underground 
was, or that it had been operating since October 1944. 
In early 1945, Zionist leaders organized an underground 
emigration route across Poland into Rumania where some Pale­
stinian shlichim were located. The hope was that Polish Jews 
could be assisted there in their emigration to Palestine. 
With the surrender of Rumania, that country became the only 
outlet to the outside world for Polish Jews as the Nazis had 
not been defeated.) 
Until September, 1945, the Brichah m Poland was run 
without a shaliah (the singular form of shlichim). The first 
shaliah in Poland, Isser Ben 2vi, was, as Bauer writes, 
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"sent to take over command of the Brichah." Therefore, 
Brichah leadership in Poland had at least some contact with 
Palestinian leadership before Isser Ben Zvi arrived, other­
wise the transfer of authority could not have occurred with 
such apparent ease. Their first contact was probably with 
the shlichim in Rumania which was necessary when Brichah 
workers brought immigrants to Rumania. The shlichim had come 
to Rumania m October, 1944, on the order of Ben-Gurion. 
Ben-Gurion had told Mapai's council in October 1944, "the 
attitude of the Jews of liberated Europe will be of great 
value in our political struggle" and went on to suggest that 
it was vital "to start preparing for the Zionist guidance of 
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the Jews of Rumania and Bulgaria." 
Even without an official shaliah m Poland until Octo­
ber 1945, the Jewish Agency still had extensive contacts 
there. Proudfoot writes, "Jewish Welfare agents...who arriv­
ed in the summer of 1945 to distribute relief supplies, 
advised migration to the western Zones of Germany and Aust­
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ria as the best possible course for Polish Jews. In additi on 
the agents gave financial assistance to further the migra-
57 
tion." Therefore, Brichah workers in Poland had consider­
able help from the Palestinian Zionists even in the early 
stages through the agencies of the Rumanian shlichim and 
different Jewish Welfare workers. 
The Jewish Agency gained more authority over the Bricn-
ah movement after it sent Isser Ben Zvi to Poland in early 
October to "take over command of the Brichah." This author­
ity continued to grow as the shlichim increased m number 
and as the presence of Jewish Agency operatives m other 
agencies made itself felt. The needs of the survivors in 
Europe were so great that UNRRA officials permitted almost 
any form of aid, and did all that was possible to assist in 
its distribution. The urgency of the situation led to a 
laxity in UNKRA bureaucracy. This laxity also made it 
virtually impossible for UNRRA to monitor adequately the 
activities of each group or even individual people in each 
of the several groups operating in Europe. (See Footnotes 1 
and 2, chapter 3.) Because UNRRA could not adequately screen 
its personnel or monitor its activities, the Jewish Agency 
found it relatively easy to reassign the Jewish Brigade 
forces to posts within the several governmental or private 
agencies working on the refugee problem. The Keports of the 
Executive of the Jewish Agency, 1951 reported, 
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In addition to their official and semi-official 
functions, the emissaries [shlichim] were active in 
organizing the Flight [Brichah] and assisting in the 
illegal immigration [Aliyah Beth/Mossad]... The Jewish 
Agency emissaries to these relief squads received 
national status from UNRRA, and they enjoyed autonomy 
in their activities in the DP camps.(58.) 
The report continues that there were lu3 "emissaries" in 
Germany and Austria, 22 m Italy and 5 m Greece by the end 
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of 1946. It. is interesting to note that the report does 
not give figures for Poland even though Bauer assures us 
that there were many there by this time. It would have been 
impolitic to have reported the presence of a iarge number of 
agents working with a secret organization when only five 
years earlier Zionist leaders had been ruthless in the 
denial of an accusation to this effect by General Morgan. 
As early as August 1945, Shaul Avigur, the head of 
Mossad (illegal immigration), administered Brichah 
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activities from Mossad's Paris headquarters. An agreement 
on November 11 between Brichah agents "provided for a 
recognition of command exercised by Palestinian shlichim 
everywhere. On the borders and in vital DP camps Palestinian 
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shlichim consequently took over." Once the shlichim took 
over, the Brichah assumed undeniably Zionist purposes. " 
With the coming of the Palestinians there were two 
developments. First, the rather hazy allegiance of 
Brichah to Mossad (62.) became clearly defined, because 
the shlichim were very definitely sent by the Mossad. 
This linking of the Brichah with the organization that 
dealt with illegal immigration was logical and 
inevitable. (63. ) 
Bauer also writes, "the shlichim were all members of the 
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b4 
Haganah, the Yishuv's mam underground movement." This 
connection is also logical as the purpose tor the 
immigration at this time was most closely linked to the need 
to create and then defend the state. The European command of 
the Haganah had been set up "to tram young Jew3 for 
paramilitary activity in Palestine and at the same time 
provide for the possible need for self-defense against anti-
Semitic attacks in Europe. Also, m 1946 the possibility of 
action against the British in Europe [!J could not be disco­
unted, and the Haganah was preparing for that 
6 5 
eventuality." Therefore, Brichah and Mossad personnel 
were hoping to select the most militant among the refugees 
who could serve in this capacity. Brichah officials m 
Poland wrote "we organized the moves to go with the 
stream...From now on we should direct it towards places 
whence immigration [to Palestine] should be possible. This 
meant to direct and select that human material that should 
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go to the shores from which immigration takes place." This 
means that only those who were sympathetic to Haganah 
objectives should go to Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy. The 
rest would be sent to the camps in Germany and Austria where 
they would help to create the "political fact" which would 
"pressure the United States to deal with the Palestinian 
problem." 
The Brichah had other sources of support as well. Per­
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haps the most important of these was the JDC. Since the JDC 
provided huge amounts of money for the general needs of all 
the Jewish DPs, and was ostensibly non-Zionist in onenta-
67 
tion, it proved strategic for Zionist goals. "The rela­
tionship between the JDC and the Brichah workers was cord­
ial, in fact JDC vehicles were often used by Brichah workers 
b a 
to get the people from the border into the camps." Horo­
witz wrote, "a firm Jewish position was taken by Dr. Joseph 
Schwartz, European director general of the JJDC. He stressed 
that while it was true that thousands of Jews were streaming 
from eastern to western Europe, at the risk of their lives 
with their pursuers hot on their heels CM, and that the JDC 
was helping them, nevertheless, 'I should feel ashamed if we 
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did not assist them with transport, shelter, and food." 
Jewish chaplains also served an indispensable role m help­
ing with the operation of the Brichah. Bauer writes: 
How did the Brichah manage to operate in Berlin? 
Who helped emissaries from the Brigade and the Polish 
youngsters who did the actual work? First of all there 
were the chaplains: Rabbi Herbert Friedman and Rabbi 
Meyer Abramowitz. 
Friedman became the aide to Rabbi Philip S. 
Bernstein, the official Jewish Adviser to General 
Joseph McNarney, the commanding General of the U.S. 
forces in Germany. 
Friedman soon got in touch with the Brigade people 
whose center was in the French zone, and he put his 
house at the disposal of the Brichah. Trucks, along 
with gasoline, tires, and spare parts were stored 
there. (He also obtained some of these in addition to 
cigarettes -- which served as currency).(70.) 
There are innumerable examples of assistance by JDC and 
U.S. Army personnel (eg. Klausner, Nadich et al) to the 
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Brichah and Mossad operations. Since Brichah workers pursued 
Zionist goals they naturally submitted reports on the condi­
tions of the infiltrees which had a Zionist slant. Since 
many JDC, UNRRA, workers and U.S. chaplains were connected 
with Brichah, they reported that the great majority of the 
infiltrees wanted to go to Palestine. 
As was the case with the DP camps, it was generally 
accepted that a vast majority of the Polish infiltrees want­
ed ultimately to go to Palestine. The IGCR reported "The 
Jewish Poles (at that time in UNRRA care) number about 
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11,000. 99% wish to go to Palestine." Nahum Goldman, in a 
conversation with under-Secretary of State Acheson said that 
that the "Jews from Poland unanimously wanted to go to 
72 
Palestine." In a press conference held on November 2b 
1946, Rabbi Bernstein, Jewish Adviser to the U.S. Army m 
Austria and Germany, estimated that between 75 and 80 
73 
percent of the Polish Jews wanted to go to Palestine. 
Later, however, the Manchester Guardian, on February 18, 
74 
1947, quoted him as saying 90 percent. 
As with the DP camps, however, direct reports from 
others, generally those in less visible positions, indicated 
otherwise. On Jan. 7, 1946, in response to the uproar caused 
by General Morgan's comments, Christian M. Ravndal, an 
American Counselor of diplomatic legation in Stockholm, 
reported that: 
138 
...a prominent American representative of Jewish 
organizations, who had just returned from Poland where 
he said he had traveled extensively in conjunction with 
relief to Jews there -- intimated that immigration was 
organized. Regarding the ultimate destination of the 
emigrants from Poland, he said that most of them 
desired to go to Palestine although undoubtedly, most 
of them would go to the U.S. if that were 
possible.(75 .) 
The embassy in Poland concurred with Ravndal's comments: 
Probably because of their strong family traditions, 
Jews generally state that they want to join their 
relatives in other countries. If given a choice, most 
would probably choose the U.S.. Palestine would 
probably rank second. Some simply want to go 'anywhere, 
just to escape Poland.'(76 . ) 
An undercover agent sent to discern the attitudes of 
the Jewish emigrants from Poland wrote, "The ultimate desti­
nation of the refugees is divided approximately between the 
United States (35%) and Palestine (40%) with the United 
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Kingdom close behind." The accuracy of these reports is 
borne out by the fact that only about half the Jews fleeing 
Poland ended up in Israel. 
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An Army undercover agent submitted a "Survey of Atti­
tudes among Jewish DP Circles" to the Office of the Politic­
al Adviser for Germany on January 8, 1947. The report's 
value is in its representative character. Since the number 
actually interviewed is relatively small (100), "any genera­
lizations from their expressed opinions would be dangerous. 
It is believed, nonetheless, that the attitudes portrayed 
are of sufficient interest and merit for transmission to the 
department." The "overwhelming majority" of the DPs which 
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the agent questioned were Polish Jews who had come to the 
American Zone as part of the Brichah. 
Most of the persons contacted plan on emigration 
to the United States or Canada. A number had originally 
intended to go to Palestine but since discarded that 
prospect as hopeless .... 
As concerns political activity, the agent has 
observed only a small group of militant active 
Zionists, most of them pronounced leftists. The active 
Zionists were not residents in the true sense, as their 
presence m the town was solely for the purpose of 
carrying on their woric. (deletion) (79. ) The very fact 
that so many of the resident members of the community 
do not hope for immigration to Palestine by legal means 
and show no inclination to avail themselves of the 
illegal routes bear witness to the relatively, perhaps 
disproportionately, small admixture of active Zionist 
element in this type of community, since, as was 
previously observed by this agent in other 
investigations, any active and trusted Zionist would be 
extended an opportunity to travel to Palestine by legal 
or illegal means, through various Jewish organizations, 
specifically the Jewish Agency or the Central Committee 
in Munich. It was also observed that the BRIKHA 
operatives (deletion) hold themselves aloof from the 
rest of the community (even though their activities are 
fully known) and make a strong differentiation between 
"idealist workers" and those who render lip service or 
assistance in exchange for profit. 
Color posters of a similar tenor [i.e. urging 
people to go to Palestine] are prominently displayed in 
the local Jewish Committee. They show, on one side, a 
lost and bedraggled Jewish immigrant standing forlornly 
with his baggage on the sidewalk amid unmistakably 
American skyscrapers. The other side shows that same 
immigrant smiling and contented, marching with a 
determined step towards a sunbathed Palestinian farm 
overflowing with produce. The attached slogan exhorts 
people to abandon thoughts of the Diaspora and to go to 
their own country where there is a place waiting for 
them. 
The Jewish Committee in town handles most of their 
administrative needs and distributes UNRRA and AJDC 
relief items. It also provides for religious, 
educational and entertainment activities.(80.) 
This report gives a fairly balanced view of the situa­
tion. The ideologically motivated Zionists were trying to 
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convince common people, who wanted to live a normal life, 
to work for a Jewish Homeland in Palestine or at least to 
choose to go there instead of America. The local committee, 
which ostensibly was the government of the Jewish DPs there, 
seemed to reflect the position of the active Zionists rather 
than the people themselves. The unrepresentative character 
of this committee is consistent with the thesis that the 
leadership of the DP camps did not truly represent the 
people but rather served as a vehicle for Zionist purposes. 
The committee could further those purposes by a judicious 
use of amenities and by gaming control of cultural, educat­
ional, and religious activities. Finally it is clear that 
the refugees did not really have a burning desire to go 
anywhere in particular except, perhaps, the United States. 
The use of "color posters" indicates a Zionist understanding 
8 1  
at a fairly high level of the pervasiveness of the "Drang 
nach Amenka" among the DP population. The use of the post­
ers also demonstrates very clearly that the intention of the 
Zionist workers was not necessarily humanitarian. They were 
concerned about much more than the needs of the Jewish DPs. 
The Brichah provided roughly <i/3 of the total number of 
DPs. That the Brichah, as a movement, was motivated by the 
fear of more persecution is beyond question, but it is also 
beyond question that this fear was fanned and encouraged by 
the Zionist workers. The main leadership of the Brichah was 
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•the Jewish Agency and its emissaries, the shlichim. The 
Brichah had great importance to the political arguments 
underway in the United States as the battle for the develop­
ment of a Jewish State was argued first before the people 
and government of the United States and then before the 
United Nations. 
Since the issue of the DPs was so important both for 
the building and defending of the State and as a vital argu­
ment for the need to create a Jewish State, it was of utmost 
importance that the people not be siphoned off prematurely 
to any other place. Their presence in the camps had to be 
assured until the the arguments had been made, the state 
created, and as many as possible transferred to that state. 
The epilogue will address what American Zionists did to 
assure that the DPs were not admitted into the United States 
before a Jewish state could be created. 
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Epilogue 
American Zionism and Immigration to the United States 
By pressing for an exodus of Jews from Europe; by 
insisting that Jewish D.P.'s do not wish to go to any 
country outside of Israel; by not participating in the 
negotiations on behalf of the D.P.'s; and by refraining 
from a campaign of their own--by all this they tthe 
Zionists] certainly did not help to open the gates of 
America for Jews. In fact, they sacrificed the 
interests of living people--their brothers and sisters 
who went through a world of pain--to the politics of 
their own movement.(1.) 
Zionist strategists used the presence of the DPs in 
Europe to stress the need for a Jewish homeland. When only 
2 
about 30,000 Jewish DPs were under UNRRA care, Ben-Gunon 
reported to the Jewish Agency on November 21, 1945: 
If we succeed in concentrating a quarter million Jews 
in the American zone, it will increase the American 
pressure Con the British]. Not because of the financial 
aspects of the problem--that does not matter to them--
but because they see no future for these people outside 
of Eretz-Yisrael. (3.) 
As Ben-Gunon bluntly pointed out, the DPs presence m the 
U.S. zone insured that the U.S. would be involved m their 
fate, and, more important for the Zionists, in the fate of 
Palestine; it guaranteed that the United States would be 
engaged on behalf of the Zionist cause. The presence of the 
DPs in the U.S. zone was fundamental for retaining this 
alliance. 
Since the DPs proved to be such valuable political 
capital, Zionist strategists needed to insure that they did 
not emigrate to other countries. If the DPs went to other 
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countries, the United States would not feel the moral pres­
sure of a large number of homeless survivors of the holo­
caust under its care. Without this pressure, the United 
States would have been much less inclined to support the 
concept of a Jewish State against the wishes of its ally 
Great Britain. Zionist strategists also needed to keep the 
DPs from emigrating elsewhere since they would be needed m 
the new state. If the DPs had been accepted by other count­
ries, the number of potential immigrants and soldiers would 
have been drastically reduced. The strategic value of keep­
ing the DPs in Europe until the creation of the state con­
vinced Zionist leaders to overlook the "immediate problems" 
of the DPs. For this reason Zionist leaders not only failed 
to work for increased immigration of the DPs to countries 
other than Palestine, but they also actively worked against 
any efforts of others to do so. Since Zionist strategists 
had placed Zionist goals above issues of rescue during the 
war, which was a life and death issue, then it stands that 
they would have done the same in less crucial situations. 
The needs of the DPs were less pressing then the needs of 
Jewish people under the threat of death. After the war, the 
Zionists continued their war-time policy of statehood before 
refugeeism. The needs of the DPs became subordinate to 
political needs which could be gained by the DPs presence in 
Europe. 
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Arthur Sulzberger, speaking at the Eightieth Anniver­
sary of the Miztah Congregation at Chattanooga called on the 
Zionists to reverse their policy of statehood before 
refugees: 
Admitting that the Jews of Europe have suffered beyond 
expression, why in God's name should the fate of these 
unhappy people be subordinated to the single cry of 
Statehood? I cannot rid myself of the feeling that the 
unfortunate Jews of Europe's D.P. camps are helpless 
hostages for whom statehood has been made the only 
ransom.(4.) 
If the American Zionist leadership was less than empha­
tic about the needs of individuals during the war when they 
faced certain death, it was even less so about the needs of 
the DPs after the war. Claiming that no country would take 
in the DPs, it insured that none would. 
Zionist historians are virtually unanimous in saying 
that no country would receive the Jewish DPs. "The DP camps 
of Europe were bulging with the restive survivors of the 
Final Solution. And no one m Europe and America wanted 
5 
them." Clearly no nation earnestly wanted them or they 
would not have been left m Europe for so long, but there is 
ample evidence that many nations contemplated bringing in, 
6 
first, Jewish refugees and later, DPs. The IRO and the IGCR 
surveyed alternative locations for the DPs. When reading 
the DP files at the National Archives one needs an atlas to 
locate all the different places which contemplated receiving 
DPs. Virtually every South American country and many Central 
7 
American countries were willing to receive DPs. Countries 
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in Africa were also receptive. Probably the most promising 
site of all was the Harar province in Ethiopia. 
Hermann Fuernberg, a refugee worker who had had worked 
with Jewish refugees in Austria since the Anschluss, con­
tinued to study the possibilities for Jewish resettlement. 
On Jan 31, 1946 he sent a report to the AACI promoting Harar 
province as the best possible site for the resettlement of 
Europe's Jewish people. The Emperor of Ethiopia, Haiie 
Selassie, was eager to receive a large number of the Europ­
ean refugees. Fuernberg writes: 
The proposal to settle Jews in Harrar [sic] is in 
no way to be considered as competitive to the existing 
Jewish National Home in Palestine. It is not intended 
to create a second Jewish Homeland in Harrar. The 
religious and spiritual Homeland for the Jews will 
always be Palestine. 
Ethiopia requires, for her own development, the 
immigration of skilled and industrious people in large 
numbers to the same degree that the European Jews need 
a place in which to settle in peace and security. Trie 
willingness of the Emperor of Ethiopia and his 
government to receive displaced persons from Europe 
into Ethiopia has been evidenced by his message to the 
Herald Tribune Forum on October 30, 1945.(8.) 
Fuernberg continued that he "positively" knew that the 
Emperor favored Jewish immigration, but as a quid pro quo, 
9 
asked for the union of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Clearly this 
was a very promising possibility which, if pursued, might 
have provided a quick solution to the homelessness of many 
of the DPs. 
This study will not try to consider the merits of each 
of the resettlement possibilities. It is conceivable that 
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none of them would have provided sufficient help to solve 
the DP problem. The main issue, however is that they were 
all simply ignored by the Zionist leaders. If some attention 
had been paid to these options it is likely that some might 
have materialized. 
One of the most likely of all possibi11tles however was 
the United States itself. 
On October 6, 1945, Virginia Gildersleeve, a U.S. dele­
gate to the United Nations, in an open letter to the New 
York Times, urged that the U.S. admit 200,000 Jews. 
...Surely it will be no kindness to the Jews to secure 
by force their admittance in very large numbers to a 
section of the world where they will have as neighbors 
many millions of enemies. 
Are not some Americans urging the plan of 
forcing Britain to force the Arabs to admit the 
homeless Jews in order to escape our own 
responsibility toward these unfortunate persons? The 
conscience of the world should recognize the obligation 
of us all to help the homeless Jew whose persecution by 
Hitler we have so bitterly denounced. Each of the 
United Nations should accept its proportionate share of 
those Jews who seek new homes. The Arab nations have 
already offered to accept their share. 
What will be the number the United States should 
admit? Perhaps 200,000? Then let congress admit these 
over and above the usual immigration quotas. And let us 
stop evading our responsibility by urging that our 
Government force Britain to force Palestine to take in 
more than its share. Thus we may avoid setting the Near 
East aflame.(10.) 
In her autobiography, Many a Great Crusade, 
Gildersleeve noted that: 
...This letter brought a storm on my head. Many 
Zionists denounced me vehemently; some threatened 
violence.(11.) 
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This response to Gildersleeve's proposal is reminiscent of 
that which Morris Ernst received. Both presented what they 
thought were charitable offers, both received taunts and 
even threats. Unless one bears m mind the reasons for such 
responses it is hard to understand them, and yet such res­
ponses are completely consistent with the Zionist program as 
outlined by Ben-Gurion and Silver. Any rescue project that 
reduced the pressure for a Jewish state had to be scrapped. 
Rescue had to be subordinated to statehood. 
During an interview. Dr. Landrum Boiling, who served as 
a correspondent for IP covering post-war Europe as of 
1 2  
summer 1945 mentioned an interesting incident that 
happened in post-war Germany. In the summer of 1946 he met a 
South African delegation which had come to Europe in order 
to bring orphaned Jewish children back to South Africa. The 
South African Jewish community had guarantees from 40U 
Jewish families, whom they judged to be competent, desirous 
of adopting one or more children. The delegation began to 
visit the different DP camps in order to find the children 
and arrange for their adoption. Four weeks later, the 
frustrated delegates decided to go back to South Africa. 
They had found only 30 children who could go. The different 
camp committees had signed up the rest of the children to go 
to Palestine, even though it meant an undetermined length of 
13 
stay in DP camps. Since there were approximately 5,000 
14 
Jewish orphans in the U.S. Zone at this time, it is 
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obvious that there was no shortage of orphaned children who 
could benefit from the South African offer. The South 
Africans were refused not because of concern for the 
children but rather because the children were important for 
the building of the Jewish state. 
One example will provide an idea of what children meant 
for the new state. Upon hearing of an offer by the Mandatory 
government to allow 5,000 children to enter Palestine, Ben-
Gurion said "We are offered the opportunity to raise a 
15 
generation for the building of the Jewish State." Children 
were vital for the new state because they represented the 
future, and would not bring any old habits. They could be 
taught to care for their nation and dispense with the old 
conciliatory patterns of Jewish life. They would be a new 
breed of Jew, tough, resilient, innovative, and able to 
defend themselves. 
The presence of the children in Germany was also impor­
tant for its propaganda value. Mrs. Charles Schwartz, Presi-
16 
dent of Hadassah, connected the needs of the DP children 
with Palestine in a letter to the New York Times, on March 
12, 1947. "Unless 54,000 Jewish refugee children in Europe 
are transferred to Palestine, they will become an 
international social problem in two years." Mrs. Waitstill 
Hastings Sharp Cof Boston] added, "if we wait two more years 
17 
these children will disappear." 
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The same children who were denied a chance to live with 
Jewish South African families just a few months earlier were 
now doomed to either become an "international social 
problem" or worse, to disappear. The emotional appeal of 
orphaned children was an advantage too good to pass up. 
On December 22, 1945, President Truman made the first 
real effort to bring DPs into the United States. With the 
President's directive "the gates of the U.S. were opened up 
for the immigration of the DPs under the existing immigra-
1 8  
tion laws and national quotas." Under Truman's directive, 
39,000 DPs per year could legally immigrate to the United 
States. However, since the directive stipulated that the 
immigration was "under the existing immigration laws and 
national quotas," only 13,000 of these could be from eastern 
Europe, the other 26,000 being reserved for Germany. Since 
most of the roughly 1,000,000 total DPs were from eastern 
Europe, Truman's directive in fact did little for the DPs--
which of course meant little for the Jewish DPs. 
Truman did not stop here, but continued to try to find 
solutions to the DP problem. On August 16, 1946 the Presi­
dent announced that he intended to bring into the country an 
unspecified number of DPs. Although he did not say so 
publicly, he contemplated as many as 300,000. This an­
nouncement caused a stir. Traditionally nativistic congress­
men balked at the thought of temporarily increasing the 
quota to allow more DPs to enter the United States. Ardent 
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Zionists, as Dmnerstem noted, regarded the announcement 
"as a declaration of collapse on Palestine by this administ­
ration, " and "feared that bringing DPs to the United States 
would weaken the pressure to establish a Jewish homeland in 
19 
Palestine." 
The new announcements by Truman exacerbated the spilt 
between Zionists and non-Zionists. For the non-Zionists who 
saw Palestine as a way to alleviate some of the suffering in 
Europe, Truman's intention to bring more DPs to the United 
States was welcome news. If Palestine opened up, so much the 
better. For Zionists however, bringing DPs to the United 
States meant sabotaging the ultimate goal of the creation of 
a Jewish State. "They believed that more than 100,000 suf­
fering Jews in Europe stood as a constant reminder of the 
world's inhumanity and their presence there buttressed the 
20 
argument for a Jewish Palestine." 
On April 27, 1947 Representative William Stratton (R-
Illinois) introduced a bill which sought to admit 400,OuO 
DPs to the United States. This amazing bill originated with 
the Citizens Committee on Displaced Persons (CCDP), headed 
21 
by Earl Harrison. The fight over this resolution became a 
battleground between non-Zionist and Zionists on immigration 
policy. 
The non-Zionists needed a vehicle which would assist 
them in their efforts to bring more of the DPs to the United 
15 6 
States. They knew that they needed a more broadly based 
organization and so established the nondenominational CCDP, 
which could then widen the appeal of bringing more DPs to 
the United States. Two organizations were fundamentally 
responsible for its creation: the American Jewish Committee 
(AJC), under the leadership of Irving Engel, directed its 
operation; the American Council for Judaism (ACJ) provided 
most of the funding. Lessing Rosenwald and his family cont­
ributed the greatest amount. William S. Bernard, a sociolog­
ist from the University of Colorado, oversaw the day-to-day 
operations and Earl Harrison lent his name to the organiza-
22 
tion as chairman. 
The CCDP met for an organizational meeting on December 
20, 1946. At the meeting William Bernard presented the 
figure of 400,000 DPs as being consistent with America's 
"fair share" (It also would have permitted roughly 100,00U 
Jews to immigrate--the set goal of the AJC Immigration Com­
mittee.) At the meeting several others who had been invited 
gave the CCDP an even greater appearance of being nondenomi­
national. The base of the organization of the CCDP continued 
to grow as Eleanor Roosevelt, Fiorello La Guardia, and 
Edward R. Stettimus, Jr., the former Secretary of State, 
Z. 
among others, lent their names to the CCDP letterhead. 
Once the organization was essentially in place the CCDP 
began massive efforts to sell a new immigration bill to the 
public. 
15 / 
After Senators Homer Ferguson and Arthur Vandenberg (R-
Michigan) and Robert Taft (R- Ohio) refused to sponsor the 
resolution, William Stratton agreed. The bill faced stiff 
opposition from nativistic Congressmen and and those fright­
ened by the possibility of allowing Communist agents into 
the country. One top secret report had been prepared for 
just this reason. An agent had been sent to a village close 
to the Kussian zone to check the attitudes of the DPs who 
intended to immigrate to the United States, he found that 
many of them were pro-Soviet. Some even demonstrated an 
24 
undue interest in U.S. military matters. Many Congressmen, 
fearing that the DPs harbored communist opinions, hesitated 
to allow them in. Senator Revercomb (R-West Virginia) ref­
lected this view. 
Certainly it would be a tragic blunder to bring into 
our midst those imbued with a communistic line of 
thought when one of the most important tasks of this 
Government today is to combat and eradicate communism 
from this country.(2b.) 
Common objections to the bill reflected both the fear of 
communist infiltration and anti-Semitism. Many of those who 
wrote to President Truman expressed opinions consistent with 
this letter: "the word 'refugee' is synonymous with Jew and 
the latter is synonymous with Red!" Newsweek reported that 
many Americans asked, "Weren't the DPs Jews, didn't they 
come from Eastern Europe? And didn't that mean that most of 
26 
them were probably Communists?" 
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Since Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Senator Robert 
Taft were the Senate Republican leaders, the CCDP had 
originally asked them to introduce the bill. Also, both 
Senators had shown great interest in the DP issue earlier 
when they had been strong supporters of Zionist legislation. 
Taft and Vandenberg were frequently mentioned in the AZEC 
minutes as strong supporters of the Zionist cause. In fact 
Rabbi Silver, who normally supported only Democratic 
candidates, was a strong supporter of Taft, whom he, at 
27 
times, even considered a friend. In fact Silver's 
patronage of Taft might have been responsible for Taft's 
victory in his senate race in 1944. James Patterson in his 
classic biography on Taft, Mr. Republican, points out the 
strong ties between Taft's pro-Zionist position and Silver's 
political patronage. "If Taft had actively opposed Zionism 
m 1944, he would not have helped his chances for re-elec-
28 
tion." After Silver had been especially helpful, Taft sent 
a letter of thanks and added, "I shall always be deeply 
29 
grateful." Apart from Senator Robert F. Wagner (D-New 
York), Senators Taft and Vandenberg were the strongest advo-
30 
cates of the Zionist cause in the Senate. Both frequently 
advised AZEC executive members and supported all the Zionist 
legislation. Senator Taft went along with Silver's proposals 
to link Britain's post-war loan request to their willingness 
31 
to open Palestine to increased immigration by Jewish DPs. 
In light of Senator Vandenberg and Senator Taft's past sup­
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port. of the DPs it seemed surprising to the CCDP that they 
did not back the Stratton bill. In fact they sabotaged it. 
Taft, in keeping with his promise to Engel (President 
of the AJC), brought the matter of an investigation of DP 
affairs to the Republican Steering Committee. He then ap­
pointed Senator William Chapman Revercomb (R-West Virginia) 
to head the committee which would oversee the task. 
32 
Revercomb, an avowed anti-Semite made no secret that he 
33 
had been a "foe of immigration all his lifetime." 
Revercomb, then, could be counted on to destroy the chances 
of the Stratton bill passing without being totally changed. 
Although State Department consultant Goldthwaite Dorr 
thought that Taft appointed Revercomb "by accident rather 
34 
than malice aforethought," it is highly unlikely that the 
Senator would have failed to understand that Revercomb's 
legendary nativism would have had a major impact on on the 
Stratton bill. It can be argued that Taft appointed 
Revercomb precisely because he would torpedo the Stratton 
Bill. 
Revercomb tried his best to do just that. Having been 
appointed Immigration Subcommitte chairman, he proceeded to 
work with other nativists in the Subcommittee and in the 
Parent Judiciary Committee to rework the DP Bill. They in­
troduced clauses which would have excluded the majority of 
the Jewish DPs. The revised bill called for admitting 
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100,000 DPs over 2 Years and confined eligibility to those 
who had arrived in the DP camps before December 22, 1945 and 
reserved 50 percent of the visas for agricultural workers 
and 50 percent for those who had been former residents of 
the Baltic States and Eastern Poland. Six sevenths of the 
Jews would have been excluded because they arrived m the 
DP camps after the cut-off date of December 22, 1945. Of the 
remaining 1/7 of the Jewish DPs in the American zone, the 
JDC estimated that only 3.7 percent had backgrounds in 
35 
agriculture. Senator Taft wrote to Lessing Rosenwald: 
I fully agree with you that the bill is very 
inadequate. I will work with those who are preparing 
amendments and do my best to see that they are 
adopted. (36 . ; 
Despite this promise, he failed to do anything. In fact, his 
inaction insured that Jewish DPs would not be able to come. 
Senator Alexander Wiley (R-Wisconsin), the Chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee, petitioned the Senate to include 
two restrietionist Senators. He did this in order to stack 
the House-Senate Conference Committee with restrictionists 
thereby defeating attempts to liberalize the DP bill. 
Neither Taft nor Vandenberg, who could have stopped Wiley's 
move, did so. Since neither Taft nor Vandenberg acted, the 
Conference Committee was controlled by the Senate restric-
tionists. As a result, the restrictionists remained "adamant 
against accepting provisions which might help the Jewish 
DPs. They gave the House members an ultimatum: either some­
161 
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thing resembling the Senate measure or nothing." 
Leonard Dmnerstein includes Taft and Vandenberg as 
main obstacles to the passage of the bill and writes: "the 
Republican leaders in both Houses of Congress, Taft and 
Vandenberg in the Senate, and Joe Martin(R-Massachusetts) 
Speaker of the House, were supremely indifferent to proraot-
38 
ing the DP cause." 
One final indictment against Taft will show that he was 
either flagrantly careless and stupid, or that he intention­
ally sabotaged a bill designed to permit Jewish DPs to 
enter into the United States. According to Dmnerstein, 
"Robert Taft claimed that he was sorry about some of the 
bill's provisions, 'particularly the [cutoff] date.'" 
Dmnerstein also noted that "according to Bernard and Engel, 
Taft had promised to vote against the December 22, i945, 
cutoff date but stepped off the floor of the Senate when the 
40 
amendment came up for a roll call." 
A newly proposed cutoff date of April 21, 1947 would 
have prevented the exclusion of 78,000 or more Jews who 
arrived at the DP camps from Eastern Europe between the 
target dates of July 22, 1945 and the April 21, 1947. It is 
highly unlikely that Taft would have accidently missed a 
vote as important as the vote on the cutoff date. 
If we consider all of his actions together, a clear 
indictment emerges. Senator Taft purposely intended to sabo­
tage the DP bill in order to restrict the immigration of 
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Jewish DPs. First he appointed Senator Revercomb to his 
position as Chairman of the DP Investigation Committee (sup­
posedly by accident); second. Senator Vandenberg and he 
failed to block Senator Wiley's move to stack the Conference 
Committee with restrictionists even though they had the 
power to do so and even though it was obvious that such a 
move doomed a more liberal bill which would have permitted a 
reasonable number of Jews to immigrate; lastly, Taft stepped 
off the Senate floor just before a vital vote on a measure 
which dealt specifically witn the Jews. It is hard to under­
stand why two Senators who consistently championed the needs 
of Jewish DPs would suddenly prove to be so negative toward 
a bill which was designed specifically to help them. The 
Senators, if not acting out of a commitment to a Zionist 
program, at least failed to take positive steps because of a 
lack of encouragement to do so. 
An ACJ editorial wondered "what different measure might 
have been passed if the powerful mass support which the 
Zionists have rallied" for a Jewish state in Palestine, "had 
been utilized in support of a better D.P. bill.... With a 
fraction of the energies that went into the Jewish nationa­
list struggle in this country, a far more adequate bill 
41 
might very well have been passed." 
In fact, in Committee hearings on the bill only one 
witness appeared for all the major Jewish Groups, Senator 
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Herbert Lehman of New York. Testimony from Jewish groups, 
none of which were Zionist, only produced eleven pages m 
the Congressional Record, whereas for the Wright-Compton 
resolution, which called for the establishment of ta Jewish 
Commonwealth, the great majority of the 500 pages of testi-
42 
mony were by Zionist groups. Obviously the Zionists would 
have supported their own legislation, but their failure to 
support legislation allowing Jewish DPs to enter into the 
United States belies their expressed reason for wanting 
Palestine. They were not interested in "alleviating human 
suffering" at least not for the DPs who were languishing m 
camps in Europe. They were mostly interested in procuring a 
Jewish State which would protect future generations from 
facing similar problems. However, in order to achieve that, 
they were willing to sacrifice the needs of the Jewish 
people in Europe. They were willing to work to restrict the 
immigration of Jewish DPs into the United States, at the 
same time they were saying that no nation would take them. 
Conclusion 
The Zionists faced formidable difficulties in their 
work to build a Jewish state. They knew that they would have 
to dedicate themselves to the task if they were to succeed. 
The needs of individual people had to be kept in 
perspective. The Jewish problem was not limited to 250,000 
people in 1947, but spanned the course of the Jewish history 
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since the dispersion and would proceed into the future if a 
Jewish state was not created. The Jewish people would always 
be at risk until they had a state of their own. They would 
always be at the mercy of Gentile governments and masses 
until they had a place where they could go to seek refuge. 
As the holocaust had proved, Jews needed a haven. 
This study should not be seen as a denial of the need 
for a Jewish haven. It merely questions a political 
philosophy that sacrifices individuals for the sake of an 
ideology, even if that ideology promises to solve great 
social problems. Approximately 1/2 of the DPs did not want 
to go to Palestine as their first choice. Many were tired of 
political struggles and simply wanted to live a peaceful 
life where their families could feel secure. Zionist efforts 
to convince them to go to Israel worked for some, coercion 
worked for others, but still, about half decided not to go. 
Although the gates of America remained closed to most of the 
Jewish DPs, thanks in part to Zionist inaction and 
collusion, 1/4 of them were willing to wait in uncertainty 
for the chance to go to the United States, even though that 
chance came two years after the creation of Israel. 
The questions raised here are central to the survival 
of Israel. The foundation of Israel was based on a 
philosophy which was willing to sacrifice individuals for 
the sake of the common good. The DPs were pawns in a 
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political power struggle. This tendency to regard the 
mividual as of less importance than the state has colored 
the development of Israel. The whole character of Israel 
continues to be influenced not just by the Holocaust, but by 
its method of gaming new immigrants. Israel's attempts to 
force Soviet Jews who receive Israeli visas to come to 
Israel is a repetition of the immigration drama which began 
with the European DPs and continues up to the present. 
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